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# Military Review

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U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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*In This Issue*

- ♦ Mission-Type Orders
- ♦ The Red Army's Role
- ♦ Management or Command?

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# UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS



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
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*Brig Gen Harry J. Lemley, Jr.*

## DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

*Col Edward Chalgren, Jr.*



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# Military Review

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# Mission-Type Orders

General Bruce C. Clarke, *United States Army*

**I**N World War II, those who served in armored divisions—and probably in other units as well—learned that mission-type orders were a requirement if the most was to be obtained from a command. Since then, we have had to consider the control of operations in the fluidity and unpredictability of nuclear battle. As battle becomes more complex and unpredictable, responsibilities must be more and more décentralized. Thus mission-type orders often will be used at all echelons of command and probably will be the rule at the division and higher levels. This will require all commanders to exercise initiative, resourcefulness, and imagination—operating with relative freedom of action.

In our tactical forces we have built-in organizational flexibility. We must recognize this and capitalize on it in our orders. To get maximum combat power, we must have plans flexible enough to meet rapidly changing situations, but careful planning is not enough. This must be coupled with the readiness to change and adapt to situations *as they are*, not as they *were expected to be*.

To train commanders and staff officers for operations in war, where mission-type orders will be widely used, it is necessary that tactical courses in our schools teach the use of such orders, and that we widely employ mission-type orders in our peacetime operations.

Basically, a mission-type order needs to cover only three important things:

- It should clearly state what the commander issuing the order wants to have accomplished.
- It should point out the limiting or control factors that must be observed for coordinating purposes.
- It should delineate the resources made available to the subordinate commander and the support which he can expect or count on from sources outside of his command.

There is a strong reluctance at every headquarters to relinquish the authority to direct the *details* of an operation. This reluctance is clearly seen in the embellishments added to an order as it threads its way down to company level. Careful judgment must be used at every echelon of command in stating the limiting and control factors in a mission-type order. Confidence must be placed



in the judgment and ability of the subordinate commander. Too often, what starts out as a broad mission-type order at a high echelon ends up with voluminous, minute, detailed, and restricting instructions specifying "how to get the job done" when it finally gets down to company level.

Many officers hearing this may *think* they would like to have a command functioning under such a system. Others who may *say* they would like to work under such a system really are disturbed by the thoughts of it. There are some officers who require something "in writing" before they will take significant action.

A mission-type order requires the subordinate commander and his staff to make basic decisions and plans based upon a careful analysis of the situation. If the basic decisions or plans are not successful, there is no paper foxhole into which they can crawl. Mission-type orders require initiative, promptness, and resourcefulness which are not always forthcoming. Problems in service schools, based upon such orders, bring forth a variety of solutions which are difficult for the faculty to grade. This sometimes looms as a very important problem.

I have said many times that a commander has two channels within which to operate. He has the "channel of command" and the "channel of suggestion." I believe that a good commander who has subordinates who are trained and have the confidence to use mission-type orders can operate almost exclusively using the "channel of suggestion," reserving the "channel of command" for use only when he wants to give special emphasis to an order, to relieve someone, to take disciplinary action, or like cases.

I went to Leavenworth over 20 years ago, so it is difficult for me to remember all the things which I must have learned then at the Command and General Staff School. The one thing that I have never forgotten and which has stood me in good stead was the teaching of General McNair, then Commandant, when he stated:

*When you receive an order or a directive from your next higher commander, do everything you can and in the best way you can to further the mission which he wants to accomplish.*


An officer who follows this advice will find that he can act promptly and aggressively with confidence. He will have no problem in operating in an environment of mission-type orders.

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# A NEW DIMENSION IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Anthony Harrigan



*The views expressed in this article are the author's and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the United States Army Command and General Staff College.—Editor.*

**W**ITH special operations destined to play an increasingly important part in the Nation's defense preparations, the time has come to consider the potential role of nuclear submarines in support of such operations.

Defense planners recognize that nuclear-powered submarines equipped with ballistic missiles are a major deterrent to Soviet nuclear aggression. It also is known that nuclear subs are a highly effective counter-weapon against an attacking submarine force. But the relation of nuclear subs to Special Forces—unconventional warfare units—has been generally overlooked.

This oversight is remarkable, for it is evident that raiders operating from nuclear submarines could play an important role in conflicts of the

future. The unconventional warfare capability of the Army could be enhanced by subs available for lightning raids and other duties.

Through use of nuclear submarines for transporting antiguerrilla forces, it would be possible to achieve the maximum in secrecy, surprise, self-sufficiency, mobility, and ease of penetration into an enemy's coastal areas.

President Kennedy has clearly stated that Special Forces are to play a larger part in possible conflict situations in the years ahead. Whether the situation is an undeclared conflict between Free World forces and Red "volunteers" on the coast of Africa, a conventional World War II-type struggle in Southeast Asia, an all-out nuclear attack, or another Korea, Special Forces will have a big job to do.

Among missions that they might be ideally suited to perform are destruction of submarine pens that are immune to air attack, capture of communication facilities, rescue of anti-Communist leaders from enemy territory, landing of guerrilla and psychological warfare teams, seizure of mine con-

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trol units at harbor mouths, secret emplacement of nuclear devices and small missile launchers on remote coasts and islands from the tropics to the polar regions, and landing of units for infiltration of the enemy's rear areas.

From the American Revolution to the Civil War and down to World War II and Korea, guerrilla operations have been of real significance. Many of these guerrilla strikes also have involved amphibious operations. In the last war, Army rangers proceeded to their destinations aboard surface ships. But World War II-type ranger operations are no longer feasible in many parts of the world because of effective radar warning nets and other detection systems. The necessity of recovering raiding parties after a strike, plus the need for secrecy, renders airdrops unsatisfactory in some situations. Air transports cannot venture over enemy territory without revealing the existence of an offensive mission, thereby attracting the attention of the enemy.

### Speed and Secrecy

Slow speed and limited carrying capacity of conventional diesel-powered submarines disqualify such craft from widespread use for raiding parties of Special Forces in the future.

The nuclear submarine could be the answer to some of the needs of Special Forces. With high underwater speed and sustained performance without the need to surface, a nuclear subma-

rine can proceed to a target area as fast as the newest destroyer in any fleet. Moreover, it can accomplish its journey in complete secrecy—not showing so much as a radar mast. If intercepted on the surface after putting a party of raiders ashore, it can dive and outrun the fastest tracking vessels. Of major importance in this era is the fact that it is not susceptible to nuclear retaliation, being able to take its contingent of raiders far below contaminated regions to an area free of lethal radioactivity.

In considering the value of nuclear submarines as transports for raiders, it should be borne in mind that guerrilla forces operating in remote areas require support if their effectiveness is to continue over a long period. Nuclear submarines are superb vehicles for supply and reinforcement in oceanic and coastal areas. For example, they could shift guerrillas from point to point in a coastal area. Another consideration is that guerrilla forces are most effective when they are adequately controlled by the over-all command. If such forces could maintain contact with the area command via a submarine moving swiftly along a coast, the effectiveness of combat units would be greatly increased.

### Future Conflict Situations

Conflict situations in wars of the future in the so-called underdeveloped areas of the world are apt to be extremely fluid. Well-defined combat zones may not exist. The struggle is likely to be sporadic and involve widely separated control points or installations of strategic importance. If, for instance, an enemy were to construct concrete submarine pens near the mouth of the Congo River on the African coast, a full-scale invasion of that territory in all likelihood would

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## NUCLEAR SUBS

not be attempted simply to achieve their destruction.


Indeed, it might be undesirable to employ nuclear weapons against the pens because of unwillingness to bring this class of weapon into the conflict, or because of a desire to avoid resentment on the part of the population of the area.

Under these circumstances, destruction of installations might have to be

case would be a nuclear submarine that could wait offshore after landing raiders, and thereby remain undetected.

### Antiguerrilla Operations

The possibility that the enemy also will employ submarine-borne raiders along the exposed shoreline of Central and South America, as well as other parts of the Free World, must be recognized. After an attack the raid-



US Navy

The nuclear-powered submarine *USS George Washington* underway in Long Island Sound. A nuclear submarine can proceed to a target area with underwater speed as fast as the newest destroyer in any fleet.

attempted by a raiding party. If the high command were to avoid sacrificing the raiders, it would be necessary to provide them with complete concealment in approach and a way of withdrawing after accomplishing their mission. The only satisfactory transport for a raiding party in this

ing party could return to their mother craft, move off, and mount an assault on another target.

In tracking down such groups, the best counterforce would be an antiguerrilla force operating from a nuclear submarine. Use of paratroopers against such an invasion force would

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
be less effective because they would be pinned to land while seaborne raiders can leave and strike other points.

The use of nuclear submarines in support of an Army special warfare mission also might include seizure of islands for weather stations (in the Indian Ocean, for example) or landing of demolition parties to blow up dams and locks. But the most impor-

ventional surface ships and conventional land forces.

### Submarines in the Arctic

But the nuclear submarine can be the means of breaking into this privileged domain. Thousands of miles of Soviet arctic territory now can be penetrated with ease by nuclear submarines operating beneath the once



US Navy

The *USS Sargo* surfaced through the ice at the North Pole. Nuclear submarines could be the means of breaking into the once-privileged domain of Soviet arctic territory.

tant area of operations might be along the Soviet Union's arctic coast.

The arctic is the most vulnerable area of the Soviet Empire. Of the 40,000 kilometers of Soviet coastline, 24,000 are in the arctic. This is the zone that the Soviets long have considered secure against land or naval attack because the frozen area cannot be penetrated conveniently by con-

protective shield of ice. Polar airbases, radar warning stations, and the industrial and power complexes of northern and Siberian Russia are exposed to attack by raiders.

Protected by ice overhead, nuclear submarines can move into these vital regions. By firing a small charge, a submarine could shatter the ice ceiling. The noise of the explosion, heard

by the Soviets, undoubtedly would be considered the breakup of an iceberg or strip of an icefield. The resultant pip on a radar scope could well be interpreted as a pressure ridge shattering the ice and forcing it high into the air. In other words, identification of such submarine breakthroughs would be almost impossible because of the frequency of natural phenomena that have the same characteristics as a submarine surfacing.

From these nuclear submarines could emerge Special Forces. These could be equipped for sabotage, either for military or industrial effect or for demoralization of the civilian population. They could abduct enemy officials, or act as espionage agents, guerrillas, or underground resistance liaison teams. Equipped with conventional weapons and nuclear-armed missiles, these Special Forces could open up another war front—a hit-and-run campaign from submarines. Reconnaissance missiles also could be used for obtaining information on industrial facilities deep in Siberia and Asiatic Russia.

### Arctic Warfare

Special Forces aboard submarines could exploit the Soviets' great fear—that of a revolution of the restless, resentful peoples in Siberian territories. The result of the use of such Special Forces would be a maximum war advantage at minimum cost in men and materiel.

That this kind of war could be fought on the top of the world is clear. Sweden, for instance, is basing much of her land defense effort on the so-called *jagars*, men trained to defend regions of that country above the Arctic Circle. The *jagars* continually hold maneuvers in the frozen wastelands, even sleeping in the snow.

Perhaps the most important feature of arctic operations by submarine-based Special Forces would be that it would carry war to the enemy's own terrain—something the enemy most wants to avoid.

Submarines were used for a large number of unconventional missions during World War II. They made many evacuation runs, removing key military personnel and bullion from besieged Corregidor and Bataan. They also delivered medical supplies, food, and ammunition to the defenders. The submarine *Seawolf*, for instance, transported 37 tons of .50-caliber ammunition and brought out 25 United States aviators, along with submarine spare parts and other equipment at Manila. The submarine *Trout* carried out two tons of gold, 18 tons of silver, and five tons of negotiable securities.

During the Solomons campaign, the submarine *Amberjack* delivered aviation gasoline to Tulagi and engaged in photographic reconnaissance of beaches marked for amphibious landings.

Throughout the war in the Pacific, submarines formed the so-called Lifeguard League, rescuing 504 airmen shot down at sea. The *Harder* went into shoal waters of Woleai Sualdn and brought out a pilot by means of crewmen in an inflatable rubber boat, being under sniper fire all the while.

### Other Special Missions

On the other side of the world, submarines also were used for special missions. One of the more notable of these was the landing of Major General Mark W. Clark from a British submarine in North Africa two weeks before Operation *Torch* commenced.

The enemy also made unconventional use of submarines in World War II. The Japanese developed the

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"piggy-backing" of small attack devices such as midjet planes. Submarine-launched aircraft carried out photoreconnaissance missions. Several of these aircraft dropped incendiary bombs in the forests of Oregon. The Germans used submarines to land espionage agents on American shores.

The question undoubtedly will arise as to whether nuclear submarines have the capability of carrying a Special Forces raider unit large enough to be effective. It suffices to note that, during the first sea-firing test of the ballistic missile submarine *George Washington*, more than 200 men reportedly were aboard the underseas craft; more than double the normal complement of the vessel. A force of 150 Special Force raiders, equipped with adequate firepower—even field-size missile launchers—would be enough to execute virtually any mission that raiders might be assigned.

Another question certain to arise is whether the United States can afford to assign nuclear submarines to the duty of transporting raiders.

Ballistic missile submarines, to be sure, could not be diverted from their task of deterring an all-out nuclear attack. Indeed, these underseas craft are too specialized to be usefully employed at other tasks. Antisubmarine warfare craft of the *Skipjack* class likewise are needed for that particular mission.

### Submarines Now Adaptable

But at least three nuclear submarines now in commission appear to be adaptable to missions of the Army's Special Forces.


One of the suitable submarines—one for which a specific mission is not a "must" in naval planning—is the

447-foot, 5,900-ton submarine *Triton*. Although originally designed to serve as a radar picket for early warning of air attack against a fleet, this underseas giant is capable of performing a number of missions. One suggestion voiced by a high-ranking naval officer is that she is ideal as an underseas command ship. The spaciousness of the craft, with ample room for the staff of a guerrilla commander, makes it an attractive and eminently suitable vessel for new types of operations by the Army's Special Forces. The capacity of the *Triton* makes her an ideal underseas transport.

Two other nuclear subs—the *Nautilus* and *Seawolf* (the first nuclear submarines constructed) are candidates for undersea transport duty. Both submarines have put in yeoman service in the initial years of the nuclear program. Both are somewhat outmoded for naval operations in the attack submarine field. With only minor modification, the *Nautilus* and *Seawolf* could add to their normal capabilities the capability of carrying Special Forces in combat operations.

Allocation of two nuclear submarines to our Special Forces might strike some laymen as an extraordinary departure from normal policy. But it should be borne in mind that the Army has had operational control of many types of vessels in modern times. It is only logical that our Special Forces have whatever types of equipment are necessary to fulfill their mission. Designating nuclear submarines for duty with the Army's Special Forces would give the nation a military capability that might mean the difference between success and failure in time of crisis.

# THE RED ARMY'S ROLE IN BUILDING COMMUNISM



Walter Darnell Jacobs

**P**REMIER Khrushchev's program for the "building of communism" has had wide practical consequences for the citizens of the USSR, including the military. The program intrudes, indeed, on all aspects of life.

In the little more than six years during which Khrushchev has controlled the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, far-reaching reforms have been made in agriculture, education, economic organization, and the law. These reforms purportedly are designed to prepare the way for the ultimate transition to true communism, by creating the abundance necessary for distribution according to Communist principles, by eliminating "the difference between the town and city," and by creating a Communist morality and consciousness among the citizens.

The grandiosity of the program arises from the meaning that the

faithful give to "communism." To them, communism is not something like freedom is to us—something that must be conquered anew each day. With their deterministic view of history, they see communism, once achieved, as a permanent state. The inevitability of history does not permit the turning back of a single page. Everything, all history, flows toward one goal—communism.

It would seem, then, that the masters of communism in the Soviet Union would have had something to say about the role of armed forces in the building of communism. And they have.

The classical Marxist view on armed forces is that they are part of the apparatus of state repression and will disappear, along with other elements of the state, whenever the utopian stage of communism is achieved. What Khrushchev is talking about in the

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here and now, however, is not the achievement of communism, but the building of it.

During the period of building, armed forces will continue to exist. They cannot disappear until communism is achieved, and that cannot occur until "capitalism and imperialism" are liquidated. The period of the building of communism, nevertheless, should see some marked changes in the organization of Soviet armed forces and in the theory underlying their organization, if only because this is a transitional period.

A number of Soviet leaders have indicated their views on the role of the armed forces during this period of transition. These views culminate in the new Soviet statutes on discipline and on garrison duty that were issued in the USSR in August 1960. Before discussing these new statutes, however, it may be useful to look at two developments that provide some historical background and perspective. These two events are the Zhukov affair and the announced reduction of the Soviet armed forces of January 1960—a reduction repudiated by Khrushchev in July of this year.

#### Charges Against Zhukov

When Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov was fired as Minister of Defense and ousted from the Central Committee

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of the party in October 1957, the chief charge against him was that he had:

*... violated Leninist Party principles for the guidance of the armed forces, [and had] pursued a policy of curtailing the work of Party organizations, political organs and military councils, [and] of abolishing the leadership and control of the Party . . . over the army and navy.*

The significance of this charge is at once evident. Marshal Zhukov was attempting, it is charged, to put the armed forces outside politics. In later discussions his errors were called "revision," and that is about the most serious charge which can be made against a party member. The following quotation from a work attacking Marshal Zhukov, published in 1960, gives the party line on the proper relation of the armed forces and the party:

*The leadership of the armed forces by the party is complete and firm. Its slightest weakening is fraught with grave consequences for our people, for the entire country. In the leadership of the Communist Party, in its policies, in its ideology is the main source of the strength and might of our army and navy.*

#### Political Control Reasserted

Thus whatever other purposes the ousting of Marshal Zhukov may have had, it was used by the party to reassert in the strongest terms possible the subordination of the armed forces to the will of the party leadership.

Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky, who succeeded Marshal Zhukov in the Defense Ministry, has proved to be most pliable in the hands of the party leaders, and appears to have no objections to absolute party domination of the armed forces. He has, in fact, enthusiastically cooperated in the party

program for intensified "ideological" indoctrination of the troops. So far as Malinovsky is concerned the lesson of the Zhukov dismissal is not lost.

It is quite possible that all officers of the Soviet armed forces are not so tractable as Malinovsky. There may be those who resent the Zhukov matter and the continued domination of the armed forces by a group of non-professionals from the party. Because of the nature of the system, such resentment is most difficult to express. There are, nevertheless, some indications that it did form a pressure—however disorganized—against implementation of Khrushchev's decision of January 1960 to reduce the armed forces by 1.2 million men.

## Soviet Reduction of Forces

The world does not know whether much reduction was actually made. Almost immediately after it was ordered, however, there was widespread evidence of hardships resulting from the reduction. These hardships were felt both inside and outside the armed forces. Inside, commanders complained that morale was damaged and that career officers were uncertain of their future. Outside, civilians complained about the privileges given to those separated, while the discharges frequently muttered about exploitation at the hands of unscrupulous civilians.

Even before Khrushchev's announcement halting the reduction of the armed forces, there had been an almost complete cessation in press reports about individuals and groups released. There had also been an increase in reports about the necessity for the maintenance of a mass Soviet Army.

Indications of support for the mass army line, as opposed to the earlier

Khrushchev "new look" theory of January 1960, are to be found in writings appearing last year in the Soviet military press. Lieutenant General Krasil'nikov wrote an essay, "On the Character of Modern War," in *Krasnaia Zvezda* (Red Star) for 18 November 1960 that had all the earmarks of an authorized policy statement. In this piece, Krasil'nikov scoffed at the theory of limited war and stated that a new war "from the very first moment . . . would become a nuclear-rocket war." In strong support of the mass army line, he added:

*A nuclear-rocket war . . . must not be thought of as a sort of 'pushbutton' war which can be conducted without mass armies and without the active participation of the nations. There is no doubt that in a new war mass, many-million-strong armies will participate.*

## The New Mass Army Concept

This seems to be the current, approved Soviet line on the size of armies in war. As such, the "new look" can be said to have been abandoned insofar as it pertains to troop reductions (but not, of course, as it pertains to the utilization of modern means of technology).

The Zhukov case and the abortive reduction program combine to form a kind of substructure for the new statutes on discipline and on garrison duty in the Soviet armed forces. The Zhukov affair served to demonstrate that the party is still boss of the armed forces, while the reaffirmation of the mass army line served to demonstrate that the professionals in the armed forces still have some say about matters normally falling within professional competency. The new statutes partially define the two areas—the area of party domination (by far

the larger) and the area of pure professional control.

### New Political Statutes

The new statutes, the first since 1946, were introduced with an all-out propaganda campaign. Many prominent military figures made statements praising them. For our purposes, the statements of Marshal Andrei Antonovich Grechko and Colonel General Filipp Ivanovich Golikov are most useful, both because of the positions of these officers and because of the contents of their statements.

Marshal Grechko is generally viewed as one of the rising stars of the Soviet armed forces. He was born in 1910 and entered the Communist Party in 1928. He was graduated from the Frunze Academy in 1935 and the Voroshilov Academy in 1941.

After a series of combat commands in World War II, he took command of Soviet forces in Germany and used those forces to suppress the revolt of 17 June 1953. He became a marshal of the Soviet Union in March 1955, being one of the youngest in that rank. After Zhukov's fall he became the commander of all Soviet ground forces and, in 1960, commander of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact states. He is presently a First Deputy Minister of Defense and a candidate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. It is obvious that he is an authoritative spokesman. His close World War II association with Khrushchev in the Ukraine does not diminish his authority.

### Anti-United States Statutes

Marshal Grechko prefaced his remarks on the new statutes by saying that:

*... the reactionary imperialists, and above all, US imperialists, continue to conduct a line of aggravating*

*international relations, preparing a new war against the USSR and the other countries of the socialist camp.*

On 9 May 1961 Grechko gave another history lecture in which he said that Western circles had backed Hitler in his attempt to conquer the Soviet Union. He specified "aggressive circles in the United States, Great Britain and France." It was to solve the problems presented by this imperialistic line, Grechko said, that the new statutes were produced.

As a good political marshal, Grechko remarked on the fact that the new statutes were approved by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the party, restoring a practice that had existed during Lenin's lifetime. This fact was but one of many demonstrating the role of the party in controlling military affairs.

Grechko then reverted, for a moment, to his role as a professional. He remarked on the great changes which had occurred since 1946, when the old statutes had been promulgated. During that period, he said, the Soviet armed forces have become "qualitatively new" and all types of arms have undergone "essential changes" in organization and in their acquisition of combat technology. Lest he be thought to have been bitten by the Zhukov bug, Grechko quickly added:

*The most important thing, however, is the fact that as a result of great organizational and educational work by the Communist Party, the unity of the army and the people and the solidarity of the fighting men around the party, its Leninist Central Committee, and the Soviet government has [been] strengthened even more.*

With his obeisances properly paid, Grechko went into a discussion of the

contents of the new statutes. He stressed the emphasis in the statutes of the principle of one-man command.

### One-Man Command

In essence, the principle of one-man command is the theory that the roles of military leadership and political guidance are concentrated in one man—the commander. This, of course, has not always been the case in the Soviet Army. The Civil War period and World War II, for instance, were notable for the utilization of political officers (or commissars). These officers ranked at least with and sometimes above the military commander of the unit concerned. The political officer was downgraded in the Frunze reforms of 1924-25, at which time the principle of one command was made a basic principle of army organization.

After the purges of the thirties, the political officer came back to prominence. Following the degrading experiences of the Finnish War, however, the post was again downgraded and a *Zampolit* (Assistant Commander for Political Affairs) appointed in his place. The *Zampolit* was subordinate to the military commander. Almost immediately after the German attack in 1941, the political officer came back to his previous eminence. When the military situation shortly improved somewhat, the *Zampolit* reappeared, again subordinate to the commander.

### Commissar or Commander?

From this short sketch of the history of political commissars and *Zampolits*, it would appear that the 1960 reinstitution of the principle of one-man command was a full victory for the professional soldier in the control of his command. Grechko certainly tried to give such an impression, by implication at least.

The true situation with regard to politico-military affairs inside the armed forces, however, is more accurately reflected in the post-Zhukov statements than in the Grechko implications. The one-man commander is "personally responsible to the Communist Party and the Soviet Government" and is charged with "strengthening party-political and educational work in the ranks. The party makes it quite clear to the commander that he is the commander only so long as he fulfills his "party-political" responsibilities. If he doesn't understand this from reading the statutes and the Grechko commentary on them, he has only to recall the Zhukov case in order to get the message.

Thus while the principle of one-man command is put forth as a device dictated by the needs of professional competence, it is also a device for the maintenance of the party's control inside the armed forces. It is only natural that Grechko dwells on the professional aspects of one-man command and not on its political side.

### Political Control

The very existence of the principle of one-man command highlights its political nature. In non-Communist armies there is no such principle because there is no need for it. The commander is the person responsible for everything that takes place in his command—there is no need for any assignment of "political" or "command" responsibility. In Communist armies, however, one-man command is simply a way of saying to the commander, "You are responsible for the political standards of your command—and don't forget it."

Marshal Grechko also introduced his discussion of the disciplinary elements of the new statutes by a refer-

ence to modern combat conditions. "Under modern conditions of war," he says, "... rocket and nuclear weapons will be widely utilized." There is no equivocation here. Grechko is asserting that there will be no war in which Soviet troops are engaged which does not see the use of nuclear weapons. From this he concludes that a higher standard of discipline is required. This discipline is not to be based on fear, but "on the high political consciousness and Communist education of the servicemen" as well as an understanding of their duty to their homeland and to the Communist Party.

The completely political nature of the Soviet Army is demonstrated by these discussions of discipline. The statutes speak of the development of a friendliness between subordinates and superiors (without loss of standards and efficiency) based on the political goals of the ideology which the army serves. This relationship is characterized as being based on the consciousness of every serviceman of the contribution he is making to "the victory of communism." Discipline, therefore, takes on, according to Grechko, "even greater significance in the period of the all-out building of communism."

#### **Discipline by "Persuasion"**

The principal means for the development of discipline based on a Communist consciousness is persuasion. Such persuasion, Grechko states, begins with explaining the policies of the party and the government but does not stop there. Strictness is required. It is particularly required under modern combat conditions. Still, the commander must be solicitous of the men's needs. "A strict commander must also be a good comrade."

One way in which he can be a good comrade, Grechko asserts, is to introduce the public into the enforcement of discipline and into the prevention of violations of discipline. This device in the new statutes corresponds to a trend in the legal reform which Khrushchev promulgated in 1958. Under the legal reform, great reliance is placed on the participation of the public in the enforcement of law. Extralegal bodies, including people's militia squads and so-called comradely courts, have the right to try and punish some offenders without recourse to the established legal codes.

The idea is that the advance toward communism has been accompanied by an increase in public consciousness. The old state forms are becoming outmoded, and new "public" organizations should take their place. These new "public" organizations are viewed as transitional forms which will disappear when true communism is achieved.

#### **Kangaroo Court-Martial**

Just how well these glorified kangaroo courts will work in conditions of military service is debatable. They must be a cause of concern to many professional officers. Nevertheless, Grechko specifically commends the utilization of "meetings of personnel for the purpose of discussing the ignoble behavior of individual servicemen and the utilization of officers' comradely courts."

Persuasion as a means of discipline is but one side of the matter. The other side is coercion. Grechko points out that the new statutes also provide for some means of coercion. A new type of punishment—admonition—has been introduced. And the "excellent soldier badge" can now be stripped from miscreants. Commanders



have the right to detain enlisted ranks in stockades for 15 days—and officers for 10. If this measure seems somewhat severe to the American serviceman, let him consider the statutes on the use of arms in maintaining discipline. The new, reformed statutes say that arms can be used against subordinates now “only when all other measures are unsuccessful.”

### Surrender Forbidden

Grechko also stresses the new statutes' orders with reference to surrender. “Devotion to communism and the belief in its ultimate victory,” he states, “inspire Soviet fighting men to the greatest self-sacrifices and heroic feats.” Note that the marshal is not at all talking about love of homeland or defense of loved ones. Devotion to communism makes it impossible for a Soviet soldier to surrender. “Nothing, not even the threat of death, must be able to force a serviceman of the USSR armed forces to give himself up as a prisoner.”

Grechko's review of the new statutes thus stresses the following points:

1. New statutes are required by new military situations in which the United States is preparing war against the Soviet bloc and in which nuclear weapons will be used.
2. The principle of one-man command is a basic organizing principle and is based on the needs of military efficiency and political indoctrination.
3. Discipline must be of a higher standard than previously and, while utilizing both persuasion and coercion, must be based on a Communist consciousness.
4. The Soviet armed forces draw their strength from confidence in the victory of communism.

### The Political View

The views of Marshal Grechko on the new statutes can be said to exemplify the military view, to the extent that the military view can be separated from the political, because Grechko's position in the Soviet system is primarily military. The political view of the statutes can similarly be said to be set forth in the comments of General Golikov. Golikov is Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. As such, he is the chief political officer of the armed services.

Golikov touched only lightly on the military aspects of the new statutes, giving even more attention than Grechko to their political bases. “They are,” he began, “a clear embodiment of the thesis that the main source of the might of the Soviet army and navy—its organizer, leader and teacher—is the Communist Party.”

Where Grechko had dwelt on the nature of the “imperialist” enemy, Golikov stressed the nature of the Soviet Army. It is, he declared, completely different from a “bourgeois” army in its nature, goals, tasks, in its very essence. It is “an army of a new type, the army of a socialist state, . . . the army educated in proletarian internationalism.”

### Proletarian Military Dogma

Golikov repeated Grechko's and the statutes' assertion that the discipline of the Soviet Army was based, not on fear, but on “the high political consciousness and Communist education of the servicemen.” It may be instructive to digress slightly here to cite the 1940 and 1946 versions of the basis of Soviet discipline (although neither Golikov nor Grechko thought this appropriate).

The 1946 formula was that discipline:

*... is founded on the consciousness of each serviceman of his military duty and personal responsibility for the defense of the Fatherland—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.*

This, of course, is a much more traditional and less political view of the bases of military discipline and could be applied, with the necessary changes of name, to many non-Socialist countries. The 1940 statutes on discipline stated that discipline:

*... is founded on the integrity of the class interests of the entire personnel of the Red Army and on its utmost devotion to its own people and on the feeling of high responsibility of every serviceman for the defense of the Socialist Fatherland. . . .*

The 1940 wording is closer to the 1960 version than is that of 1946, but still falls short of the completely political approach of the current statutes. Golikov and Grechko probably failed to stress this fact, or even to mention it, because it demonstrates what they are trying (by implication) to deny—that the political control of the Soviet Army is greater now than it has been under previous statutes, and probably greater than at any time since the reforms of 1924-25.

#### **Discipline and Ideology**

Golikov discusses discipline only in relation to the ideology and the party. The party leads; the army follows. "Party-political work" must be intensified. Military service must be regarded as "an inseparable part of the all-national struggle for the building of communism." Discipline is meaningless without party direction. In his enthusiasm for party direction, Golikov gives away the true meaning of the reestablishment of the principle

of one-man command. The role of political workers, he admits, is increased under the new statutes.

Political workers are called on to work "in close unity with the one-man commander." Golikov quotes the statutes to detail the responsibilities of the political workers. They include:

*... participation in planning military and political training, implementation of measures for organizing socialist competition, fostering among servicemen of personal responsibility for mastering and keeping in constant combat readiness weapons and military equipment, and also the fulfillment of a number of other tasks.*

One wonders what responsibility (indeed, what command) is left to the one-man commander.

#### **Political Army Training**

Golikov is not concerned, even to the limited extent of Grechko, with the military basis of the army. So it is quite simple for Golikov to proclaim that the basis of the political and military training of the army "has been and remains the immortal ideas of Marxism-Leninism." That these "immortal" ideas should provide the basis for military training was an idea specifically rejected by Lenin in 1922—another fact that Golikov neglects to mention.

Golikov is even more enthusiastic than Grechko about reliance on public judgment as a means of punishing violators of military discipline. He states that "the collective" is better for this type of thing than is any individual soldier or officer because "offenses do not go unnoticed by the collective, there is a better organization and order, and the level of the moral-political standard of personnel is higher." This is the purest sort of vulgar "leftism" in communism. Its

acceptance in the current statutes is but another strong example of the triumph of political considerations over military needs.

### Collective Discipline

Golikov may be quite correct in his assumption that the "collective" will be stricter than the individual. The experience of "criticism and self-criticism" in the Soviet Union and of public confession in Communist China points in that direction. In any case, Golikov does not disguise his feelings when he declares that "there is no place for tolerance and decadent liberalism, either by commanders and political workers or court and prosecutor's organs."

Discipline is particularly important at this time, to Golikov, not because of the needs of the military service but because "Soviet society has entered a period of all-out building of communism." The serviceman is, therefore, required "strictly to observe the requirements of Communist morality." (How the Soviet professional officer must envy his Western brother who is only concerned with discipline in the interests of military efficiency!)

Golikov discusses the place of persuasion and coercion in fostering military discipline, but gives little moment to the role of persuasion. He quotes, with approval, I. S. Krylov's axiom that "In order not to squander words needlessly, force must be used whenever necessary."

### Party Line Coercion

Golikov's views on the new statutes can be summarized:

1. They embody the thesis that the Communist Party is the directing body of the Soviet armed forces.

2. Discipline should be based on Communist consciousness, with the

broad utilization of collective measures of justice.

3. The role of the political worker is to be increased.

4. Coercion should be resorted to whenever necessary.

The new statutes on discipline and garrison duty in the Soviet armed forces show a strong increase in the role of political forces in the daily life of the Soviet serviceman. They show an increased subordination of the professional soldier to the politician from the Communist Party. They show a "leftist" trend in Soviet military affairs which is stronger than any similar trend since, at least, the 1924-25 reforms.

This strong political tone in the new statutes is directly connected with Khrushchev's program for the building of communism in the Soviet Union. The new statutes thus have a stronger ideological basis than previous statutes. The transformation that Khrushchev is attempting to work in all sectors of the Soviet system is now being attempted with the armed forces.

### Basis for New Doctrine

Khrushchev has attempted to lay the foundation for this transformation. First, he dismissed Marshal Zhukov and has demonstrated to the recalcitrant officers who may still exist in the Soviet armed forces the dangers of attempting to place military and national considerations above the interests of the Communist Party. Second, he has made some superficial concessions to professional military thought by putting the brakes to the reduction of the armed forces and by giving high positions to some officers (Grechko, Moskalenko, and Malinovsky). Third, he has based his program



for the transformation of the armed forces on ideological grounds.

To the Western observer, the third reason listed above may seem to be the weakest of the entire program. That may prove to be the case. It should be kept in mind, however, that party domination of the army is apparently stronger today than it has been at any time in the past (not even excluding the period following the great purges). Marxism-Leninism represents the political leaders' only appeal to the Soviet bloc (and to the USSR) which equals or overrides the appeals peculiarly available to the military leaders.

### The Ideological Appeal

Military leaders can make appeals based on patriotism and love of the homeland. When they make appeals based on ideology they are playing the politicians' game, because they can always be overcalled. It doesn't work the other way, however; the politicians can, in times of emergency, use the patriotic appeal as well as the ideological appeal.

Khrushchev is probably right, to a degree, when he says that "belief in the ultimate victory of our cause" is a strong force not only to civilians but also to members of the armed forces. The ideology promises success. For Khrushchev, certainly, the ideology has already provided whatever success he enjoys in life. Whether or not he believes in the ideology is relatively unimportant; it has provided him success and a tool—and he has nothing else in which to believe.

In the long run, however, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism is shockingly insufficient. Its shortcomings, so visible to those outside the realm of its rule, are also visible to its subjects. The time will surely come when it is rejected in fact and deed by those now under it. The approach of that date may have been speeded by the political stridency of the new statutes. "Communist morality," the purported basis of these statutes, is a criminal anachronism. It is, as Stalin used to say about honest diplomacy, like dry water—it can exist in speech but not in fact.

### The apostle of peace speaks:

... The Soviet Army must be ready at any moment to defend reliably the peaceful construction of communism in the Soviet Union and to fulfill its internationalist duty of rendering aid to the other Socialist nations.

\* \* \* \* \*

Taking into account the obtaining situation, the Soviet Government was compelled to instruct the Defense Ministry to suspend, temporarily, pending special orders, the reduction of the armed forces planned for 1961.

... the Soviet Government has passed a decision to increase defense spendings in the current year by 3,144,000,000 rubles, thereby raising the total military spendings in 1961 to 12,399,000,000 rubles. ...

*Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev*  
An address at the Kremlin 8 July 1961.



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ways has been, and still is, by sea. Even on the four largest islands, owing to their mountainous nature, roads development has not been good. Since 1948 a road construction program has been in progress, and the picture has improved considerably. Railway communication also is limited as there are just over 48,279 kilometers of track, much of which is single, narrow gauge. The frequent necessity for bridges, tunnels, and embankments has restricted the rapid development of land communication.

To the north of Japan is the Soviet island of Sakhalin, separated only by a narrow strait, while the Soviet-occupied Kuril Islands are even closer. To the west, only about 200 kilometers of sea separate Japan from the peninsula of Korea, while still farther west the Communist Chinese mainland is only about 966 kilometers distant. Strategically, Japan is ideally situated to become a bastion against Communist expansion.

### Modern Military History

When Japan was opened up to the West in 1853, she at once awoke to the 19th century and began a feverish race to catch up industrially and technically. She greedily adopted and copied Western ideas. In 1862 the shogun\* experimented with a European-type army, building up a small force numbering about 13,600 men. Rifles and cannon replaced the bow and arrow in this force but it was disbanded on the fall of the shogunate in 1867.

However, it served as a pattern for

\* Feudal military officer who ruled Japan in the name of the Emperor.

*Digested from the original article which appeared in the AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL, March 1961.*

the future. A little later a small modern army was formed which quickly increased in size when conscription was decreed in 1873. This new army, and the progressive Western ideas which it adopted, did not find favor with the older, conservative elements. In 1877 it had to take the field against the samurai, the traditional warrior caste, and to fight an eight-month campaign against it.

In 1873 Japan established a small navy with the help of the British.

The first real test of the new Japanese Army came in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1905, from which valuable lessons were learned. This war resulted in Taiwan being given to Japan, and the Japanese being allowed a free hand in Korea, then nominally under Chinese rule. In 1900 Japan sent a small detachment to China to take part in the Relief of Peking. This detachment impressed all the military observers by its efficiency.

In the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05, Japan successfully faced a non-Asiatic power and deployed large land forces for the first time. Then, after playing only a minor part in the First World War, she developed a peacetime standing army of about 300,000 men, and a fair-sized navy.

In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and thus began a 24-year period of active operations, which did not end until her defeat in 1945. In 1931 and 1932 there were Japanese campaigns in Manchuria and around Shanghai, and in 1935 she deployed forces in North China. In 1937 Japan seriously began hostilities against the Chinese Nationalists. These continued beyond 1941, although after that date her main strength and energies were directed elsewhere, for her attack on

Pearl Harbor, in December 1941, brought both Japan and America into the Second World War.

Conscription had created large reserves of trained manpower, and the maximum strength of the Japanese armed forces rose during World War II to the five million mark. At one time the army consisted of over 140 divisions. The navy entered the war with about 200 ships and 67 subma-

power, did her utmost to break down the Japanese war potential. Her armed forces were completely demobilized and her war industries crushed and broken up. By education and propaganda, an effort was made to change the warlike outlook and military character of the Japanese people. This largely was successful, as there was a violent reaction to militarism following defeat. The military junta



*Embassy of Japan*

### Headquarters, Japanese Defense Agency in Tokyo

rines, many of which subsequently were lost in action.

On 6 August 1945 the first atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. On 8 August the Soviet Union came into the war against Japan. On 9 August the second atom bomb fell on Nagasaki, and on 2 September the formal document of surrender was signed.

### Rebirth of the Armed Forces

Starting promptly in September 1945, America, as the occupying

was discredited and America was able to plant the seeds of democracy and pacifism in fertile ground. The new Japanese constitution outlawed war and prohibited the maintaining of any armed forces.

Only a small nucleus of an armed, disciplined body remained in being, known, first, as the Police Reserve and, later, as the National Safety Force.

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
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Review



Japan's plans for reorganization of her armed forces call for considerable expansion of her ground forces. The number of divisions is to be increased from six to eight this year with an additional five divisions to be organized in 1962 to bring the new total to 13 divisions. Divisional organization structure is being modified. The new divisions will have about 9,000 men each as opposed to the 12,700 now authorized and they will consist of four battle groups of five companies each. The map, above, shows the planned disposition of the new 13-division structure.—Editor.

and the victory of the Communists in China made America severely modify her initial policy in Japan, and she began to regard the country in a new light, as a possible future ally in any fight against communism. The Korean War added impetus to this change in attitude toward the Japanese. The United States now tried to persuade them to re-form their defense forces,

velop armed forces, a joint American-Japanese Treaty was signed in 1951. The Japanese did not consider its terms to be particularly favorable to them, but it was accepted as being preferable to remaining "enemy-occupied" territory.

Eventually, Japan agreed to develop and maintain a defense force of about 250,000. America had suggested and



US Army

**Soldiers of the Ground Self-Defense Force build a Bailey bridge during field exercises near Hokkaido**

but found that the seeds she had planted so well had taken root and flourished. The Japanese were reluctant to reestablish military forces, and even more reluctant to pay for their upkeep.

To remain in Japan as the oppressive "occupying power" was not tactful under the circumstances so, as a first step in encouraging Japan to de-

veloped for one of at least 356,000. In March 1953 a mutual defense agreement with America was signed, and America agreed to provide some technical equipment and jet aircraft.

By this time the National Safety Force had become a miniature army, and there was a miniature navy in being as well, the two having grown to a strength of about 110,000 men all



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Review

told. The navy, known as the Coastal Safety Force, had a strength of about 30,000 men and over 200 small ships.

In June 1954 the National Defense Council was set up to advise the Japanese Cabinet on defense matters, and the National Safety Force changed its name to the National Self-Defense Forces. A defense agency controlled the three services, the army, the navy,

small arms. Its numbers increased, but slowly. America provided tanks and other technical equipment and helped in training matters. Japanese officers attended courses of instruction in American military schools.

Today, the Ground Self-Defense Force of Japan is reputed to number about 170,000 men, but this is considered to be the "basic" figure, and



US Army

M24 tanks furnished the Ground Self-Defense Force under the US Mutual Defense Assistance Program

and the air force, each of which had its own chief of staff. The newly styled self-defense forces had an uphill struggle against antimilitary prejudices and government indifference.

### The Army

The army, known as the Ground Self-Defense Force, began with an inherited strength of about 100,000 men, mostly infantry armed with

the true one may be higher. The field army consists of six divisions, four combined brigades, three tank groups, and supporting artillery, signal, and engineer units. The divisions are infantry with a field artillery component. The combined brigades, at the moment, consist of a mechanized infantry regiment of three battalions, and an artillery regiment. The organization of the three tank groups



US Army

Japanese soldiers study the use of the recoilless rifle (above) and noncommissioned officers of the Ground Self-Defense Force take part in a tactical exercise (below)



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does not yet seem to have been settled, but they have both light and medium American tanks.

The army has its own air component, and possesses just over 100 light aircraft of different kinds, as well as a few helicopters.

For administrative purposes, Japan is divided into five military "areas."

Planned expansion for the Ground Self-Defense Force includes the for-

ing the academy, officer cadets serve for a year as sergeants before being commissioned. Several classes have since graduated from the Defense Academy so the shortage of younger officers is not now so acute. As the academy is capable of being expanded, it should be able to supply sufficient young Regular officers for the forces in the future.

The enlisted men are all volunteers,



*Embassy of Japan*

**F-86 jets of the Air Self-Defense Force patrol over Mount Fuji**

mation of an airborne division, and a helicopter wing, as well as several additional mechanized brigades. A school of electronics and other training establishments are planned but are slightly behind schedule.

Most of the Japanese officers, especially the senior ones and those in the middle grades, saw service in the Second World War. The army is short of young, junior officers. To remedy this a Defense Academy was established in 1953. It met with many difficulties, and the first officer cadets did not graduate until 1957. On leav-

and the warrant officers and senior sergeants have all seen war service.

**Air Force**

Japanese civil aviation was resumed in 1951, and what became the Air Self-Defense Force was created formally in January 1953 with an initial establishment of about 2,500 men. It began with six wings, each of 18 light aircraft. During the following two years another 140 aircraft were received from America. Since then an average of about 200 aircraft a year have been added to the air force, mainly from America, although the

## JAPAN'S ARMED FORCES

Japanese aircraft industry now is contributing its quota.

The ban on the production of Japanese military aircraft ended in March 1953. The Japanese aircraft industry has developed fairly quickly.

At present the Air Self-Defense Force is organized into two tactical wings, two fighter-interceptor wings, and a few transport squadrons. It is thought that it has 1,350 aircraft, mainly *F-86* jet fighters, trainer air-

1961 is to build it up to 27 fighter-interceptor squadrons and six transport squadrons. The aim is to possess sufficient transport aircraft to carry the projected airborne division. No plans for a bomber force have yet been made public.

### Navy

Japan has the third largest navy in Asia, coming only after Communist China and Nationalist China. This has



*Embassy of Japan*

**Japanese naval forces are designed for coastal defense of the island Empire**

craft, and transport planes. There are at least 400 jet aircraft, with more than sufficient trained pilots to fly them. By 1958, the Air Arm had reached a strength of over 20,000, and today it exceeds 33,000.

The air force controls rocket-launching equipment which has been supplied by America, and is in the process of forming a guided missile corps. Japan has a few air-to-air missiles.

The air force expansion plan for

developed from the Maritime Safety Board and the Coastal Safety Force, and now has assumed responsibility for coastal defense and minesweeping.

The navy has a total of over 400 vessels, with a tonnage of 116,000 tons, of which about 200 are antisubmarine craft. All these ships are small, but they include 18 destroyers, 24 frigates, and five submarines. The navy has an estimated personnel strength of over 30,000. The Naval

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Self-Defense Force has its own air arm with at least 200 aircraft.

After a hesitant start there are signs that traditional military spirit and pride are breaking through again. The armed forces are manned by volunteers. Knowing how well the Japanese fought during the Second World War, one would automatically assume that morale is high, but some reports indicate that this may not be so.

The armed forces have realized

atmosphere have affected morale and have given the forces an inferiority complex and an apologetic outlook on life, but there are recent signs that this may not be true.

### War Potential

America would like to see Japan forming a vital link with Taiwan and the Philippines in the chain of islands which form her outer defenses. She hopes that Japan will develop into a strong, sure bastion against Commu-



Japanese aircraft production assembly line

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that they could not exist if the population, in its new mood, actively turned against them. They have tactfully avoided the limelight and kept clear of any controversial issues while the antimilitary mood prevailed. The nominally civilian defense agency has done its best in a quiet way to sell the forces to the nation. It is succeeding slowly. For example, the army has built roads and sea walls and has done extensive rescue work in the typhoon disasters.

It frequently has been suggested that some years in this antimilitary

nist infiltration. Is Japan able and willing to play that part?

Japan rose, became powerful, and in spite of having only a comparatively small population and springing from a small country, she once controlled huge areas of Asia. The question is, can she become strong again, now that all ideas of keeping her disarmed have faded away? Previously, she relied to a large extent upon the products and labor of the overseas territory she occupied, such as the industrial complex of Manchuria, for her ability to wage war.

y Review

However, her economic recovery from the postwar attempt to eradicate her war industries has been remarkable. By Asian standards, she is stable and even prosperous. Two factors undoubtedly have helped her, one is the fact that America has poured in an average of about 178 million dollars a year to aid her recovery, and the other is the Korean War, which gave a boost to her industries.

Now all her light industries are thriving and all her former heavier war industries could, with American aid, be developed and expanded quickly. Some, for example shipbuilding and aircraft manufacture, are already in a healthy state. Her population is sufficiently large to man these potential industries and still have ample left over for the defense forces.

Although small at the moment, her armed forces could be quickly expanded by conscription, a characteristic not unfamiliar to Japanese life. American economic aid would be necessary but clearly Japan could be built up into a strong power again, both from a military and an economic point of view.

The question also remaining is, if Japan did become powerful, would she be actively anti-Communist, remain obstinately neutral, or would she slip behind the Bamboo Curtain?

The spirit of democracy in Japan, planted by America after the war, has allowed vociferous Communist and other leftwing elements to shout their

opinions and to try and intimidate those who do not agree with them. They are working to keep Japan neutral and to prevent her from becoming entangled in military alliances with the West. The incidents at the passing of the revised Japanese-American Treaty, in June 1960, which caused the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit, are an example.

It is thought, and hoped, that this anti-Western, antimilitarist, and pro-Communist element is not truly representative of the Japanese people, and does not control Japan's destinies. If it does, the picture may not be so hopeful, but working on the assumption that the bulk of the Japanese people have not changed fundamentally, there is little need for pessimism on this score. Japan traditionally is antagonistic toward China and the Soviet Union, and has never really been friendly with Korea. This leads one to believe that there is no real reason to think that she will suddenly drop out of the "island chain of defense" against communism.

### Conclusion

The Japanese war potential certainly is considerable. She has a small but flourishing defense force, built on sound lines, capable of rapid expansion, and backed by sufficient industry to maintain it in the field. There is little reason why Japan should not become the strongest link in the "island chain."

# Management or **COMMAND**

Lieutenant Colonel David M. Ramsey, Jr.,

*United States Army*

EVERY professional military man in recent years has read or heard the theory expressed that management and command are essentially the same thing. Chances are better than even, in fact, that he has never heard any serious dissent from the proposition that the terms *command* and *management* are synonymous, or nearly so. As a word, as a concept, and even as an administrative practice, "management" has infiltrated our military organizations to an extent unheard of until recent years.

The equating of command with management has become a striking fashion in current literature on the administration of military affairs. As with any fashion, this concept can be carried to the point of general, unquestioning acceptance—with all the dangers that blind acceptance connotes. Such "cult" or "fad" theorizing may take the dangerous form of overstressing similarities while glossing over less numerous, but crucial, differences.

The trouble with the current trend of theory in this area is its tendency to oversimplify and to overgeneralize,

with respect to the administration of two quite different institutions—civilian industry and the Military Establishment.

It cannot be denied that certain functions of management—planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling—are found in every kind of formal organization. Nor can it be denied that such activities as establishing objectives, motivating people, making decisions, communicating, and innovating are among the principal tasks of both business managers and military commanders. Nor is it subject to dispute that leadership is an essential characteristic or element of both the good manager and the good commander. Neither military command nor business management has a corner on the leadership market.

In the face of this strong evidence of similarity, it is not surprising that a fashion has developed of considering the two activities as more or less identical. Yet there is a world of difference between "similar" and "identical," as may be seen when the essential natures of command and management are examined.

## MANAGEMENT OR COMMAND?

Throughout American history the military has been recognized as non-productive; indeed, this fact has always provided one of the most popular arguments against maintaining large military forces in peacetime. Business management, on the other hand, is productive—of goods or services or both. Does it follow that the methods and techniques of the productive enterprise are equally applicable to the unproductive one? Yet the military in recent years has come to embrace, increasingly, the term *management*, while the business community continues to avoid, studiously, the use of the term *command* within its institution.

### Command Unsuitable to Business

Many factors are cited as reasons, in the literature on business management, for avoiding the term *command*: abhorrence of the alleged autocratic connotation of the word, implied or actual prohibitions imposed by labor unions, the term's alleged deprecation of the dignity of the individual, and so on. Rarely, if ever, is the argument advanced that command simply is not the directive procedure of a business organization, any more than management is the directive procedure of a military organization. Yet this is the crux of the matter. The business enterprise recognizes the fact

very well; there seems to be some doubt that the military does.

One could eliminate much controversy here on the basis of definition alone. *Command* can be defined in a number of ways, depending upon the terms of reference desired or the part of speech employed. In the usual military context, the verb *command* means to direct authoritatively or to have control of. It implies formal and official authority. The noun *command* is also defined in terms of authority, or is used to indicate a military force or installation. In any case, no matter how the word is used, emphasis is always on authority.

### Management as Process

On the other hand, *management* is usually defined as a process of employing resources of men, money, and materials to accomplish predetermined objectives, or as the function of getting things done through others.

Thus a basic difference between the meanings of the terms under examination becomes immediately evident—command essentially involves authority, and management, defined as a process, does not.

Most military authorities accept the proposition that the management process in a general sense is inherent in command. There cannot be any quarrel with this concept; men, money, and materials constitute the object of command, and melding these resources into action toward achievement of an objective constitutes the dynamic process of management.

Commanders have always had to administer resources. The advent of "management" has not changed what the commander has always had to do. But to recognize that the management process is inherent in command is to make clear one principal differ-

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ence between them: The management process is only a lesser element or aspect of command.

Management considered as a controlling organ is unique to the business community. Peter F. Drucker in his book, *The Practice of Management*, states that "management is the specific organ of the business enterprise." It differs from all other governing organs of all other institutions, even such other organs as seem not unlike the management of a business enterprise. In other words, management per se is the management of a business enterprise. The aim of civilian business is economic performance, and management must always, in every decision and action, place economic performance first.

Military command, on the other hand, is concerned primarily with national security; economic considerations are of secondary importance to it. Economic aspects of military decisions may have a modifying effect on those decisions, but they should never be the basis for them. Considerations of national security alone must be the basis for military decisions, and any other basis represents a betrayal of the Nation's trust. Consequently, if management is concerned primarily with economic results, it cannot be an appropriate activity of military command in discharging its responsibilities for national security.

### The Noncommercial Institutions

Can the administration of any great noncommercial institution—church, government, or army—be rooted in a desire to economize, or in economic performance? Certainly not. Unlike these institutions, the business enterprise exists for the sole purpose of producing economic goods and services. Properly, it alone is "managed."

Peter F. Drucker also makes the point that the business manager has an "entrepreneurial" function which corresponds to the function of devising "strategy" in the military or to "political decision making" in government. These functions are very different, and this fact makes a profound difference between command and management.

Performance in all organizations is measured against results. This is another way of saying that evaluation is made in terms of accomplishment of objective. That the objectives of business, government, and the military differ widely from each other is self-evident. Therefore, the results desired in one of these enterprises are quite logically unlike those desired in the other two. Performance and its results together determine what should be done, and even—to a large extent—how it should be done.

Here, then, in their vital nonadministrative roles, command and management part company. Methodologies and techniques useful to one are not necessarily appropriate to the other. It could hardly be otherwise, when the purpose of one is economic performance, and of the other, success in war.

### Army Management

The creation of the military controller function and of the Army Command Management System (ACMS) was justified by their proponents largely on the basis that administering an army is in many respects similar to the management of a civilian business. In terms of resources used, the Army is admittedly very much like the biggest of big business. Thus the rationale for application of business methods and techniques to military organizations is established. And this doctrine is reasonable, so long as

these methods and techniques are applied to the "business end" of military activity—budgeting and accounting for men, money, and materials.

However, the concept has grown far beyond its original meaning. Now, instead of effective command, dynamic "management" has become—for many theorists—the panacea for all military ills. If Drucker is right—and there is good evidence that he is—the military is being forced to pay increasing attention to economic performance, a secondary consideration, at the expense of national security, its primary and overriding concern.

If business management were identical with military command or with the administration of church or government, it could be inferred that the knowledge and skills of one are transferable to the others. However, by logic and the record, such interchangeability is unlikely. Administrative skills may be transferable, but they are secondary elements in achieving the objectives of the noncommercial institution.

### Commanders Not Managers

We have had many government leaders and military commanders who were poor "managers," but whose places in history are rightly determined by the wisdom of their political and military decisions, not by their managerial abilities. History records numerous instances of top-drawer men in one field who failed miserably in another. Is this so surprising, considering the wide gulfs between political, military, church, and business objectives?

Perhaps the most significant difference between command and management occurs with respect to the authority that each possesses. Command presupposes authority, with its

disciplinary prerogative. Management does not possess such power—a fact that must not be forgotten when business management practices are considered for military adoption.

Business management's authority is restricted to that necessary to discharge its economic responsibility. It exercises authority over individuals only in their roles as members of the business organization. While management dares not ignore its responsibilities to society, it has no authority over the individual except in connection with performance on the job. Moreover, such social authority as management may have over individuals must be shared with other groups.

The authority of command, however, goes far beyond any such restriction. It transcends control of performance on the job. It is a full-time authority encompassing every facet of a soldier's existence—his ability, potentiality, professional knowledge, personal life, and, in time of war, his physical survival. It is a total authority, reaching to a depth far beyond that of any other secular power. Moreover, most significantly, all of this authority is solidly founded upon law and tradition—law and tradition which do not apply to business management.

### The Question of Leadership

It is sometimes argued that military command, based as it is on authority, is no longer adequate to direct military affairs in their present-day complexities. This argument presupposes that reliance on authority, with its related concepts of subordination, obedience, and discipline, no longer satisfies the requirements of modern society, particularly when these are viewed in light of our present knowledge of human motivation.

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Here is where the question of leadership enters the scene.

Motivation is to a great extent the problem confronting leadership, irrespective of kind of organization. Yet there is a vital difference between command and management in this area too. One can never lose sight of the fact that the military is subject to stresses and strains which are not encountered in any other institution.

Business management and military command are both concerned with the element of time—present and future. But here again there is an important difference, although it is perhaps but a difference in degree or emphasis. Management continuously plans for the future while keeping a hand on current performance. Long-range planning is indispensable, yet current operations must provide satisfactory



Command is fundamental to success in war

Military command is charged with the unenviable responsibility of subjecting men to possible death in war. No comparable responsibility is thrust upon management. Men cannot be "managed" in the face of enemy troops. They must be "commanded." Management is surely appropriate to economic situations, but it is conspicuously illogical and ineffective on the battlefield. There, greater responsibility requires greater authority.

economic results—or else there may not even be an organization to manage in the future.

### Time and the Military

Military command is also concerned with both present and future, but rarely with both at the same time. Today, the military is engaged in being prepared for war should it come. There is really no other basis on which to justify a military force in peace-

time. In effect, in peacetime there is no present justification for the military; there is only a preparation for the future—for war itself.

In war itself there is only the shortest of a short-range future. Victory in the briefest possible time is the compelling objective. In war, then, it is the present time with which the military is concerned, and not the future. Success (victory) in the present is the only foundation for a future.

In reflecting upon the validity of the term *management* in its application to nonbusiness organizations, one might consider the case of civil government operations. Seldom, if ever, is the administration of a government agency referred to as management. Invariably, the term used is *public administration*. One good reason for this is that *management* pertains to a business enterprise, not to a political body. Does it not follow, then, that *management* is an equally inappropriate term to apply to the military, which is a subsidiary of government? In this context *military administration* is surely a far more accurate term to use than *military management*.

Logic dictates the exclusion of the word *command* from civilian industry even though many military principles have been applied to business enterprises—such as the generally accepted line and staff concept. Similarly, it would be reasonable to exclude the business-enterprise terms, *management* and *manager*, from military terminology.

### Military Administration

There is no intention here of implying that military command is a peculiar institution set wholly apart from business institutions. On the contrary, the administrative similarities of business and military organizations are

probably more noteworthy than their dissimilarities.

Yet the differences, although admittedly few, "make all the difference." Differences in roles and purposes, in derivation and degree of authority, in responsibilities, and in time perspective have been mentioned here in order to establish and emphasize the fact that military command and business management are not identical despite their many similarities.

It is time that the term "military command" be restored to its former traditional position of honor. Tradition itself, incidentally, provides a powerful reason for so doing. Tradition does not consist in blind adherence to the past, but in retention of those practices, customs, or institutions which have time and time again inspired contemporary man to greater heights of achievement.

The traditional military command, with its few renowned and countless unsung heroes serving as commanders, has led American fighting men to triumphs under pressures of responsibilities unequalled in any other walk of life. Can the same be said for management and managers? Does a powerful tradition of management exist at all?

### The Tradition of Command

Why, then, do we deprecate the concept of military command? Why do we seem to have such a sense of guilt in espousing this traditional ideal? Why has the word *management* infiltrated to the point where we now speak of "military managers," "military management," "command management," and the like in lieu of the previously respected commander and his command?

Without question, civilian industry and its management process have

much to offer the military, particularly in the personnel and logistics fields. Moreover, it must be acknowledged that technical service installations such as arsenals, where manufacturing is a major activity, come very close to being business enterprises in every sense of that term. In these cases the application of proved management techniques to the military activity makes good sense. Nevertheless, even in these limited instances, management is not and can never be an equivalent of or a substitute for authoritative command.

The real danger, in the current trend of imitating business methods in the military, lies in the temptation to apply them to tactics and strategy, for which they were never intended and where they have little or no chance of working. It is easy to criticize present military performance on an economic basis, since military forces are essentially nonproductive segments of national life. It is far more difficult to foresee the requirements of the battlefield of the future, and the preparation necessary to meet those requirements.

### The Present Danger

Can there be any assurance that present emphasis on military management, in preference to military command, will contribute to a more adequate national defense? Or is there a hidden danger that we will become so preoccupied with efficient management, business style, that we will lose sight of the critical objective—preparation for successful waging of war?

There isn't even any assurance that efficient business management and proper combat readiness are necessarily compatible. The management experts would have us believe that the

military has been shamefully inefficient and wasteful in the past for lack of attention to sound managerial practices. Yet with nonmanagerial practices we have been successful in war. It is, after all, the payoff that counts.

One must keep in mind that war is wasteful and destructive, and that military forces are economically unproductive. Consequently, undue preoccupation with economic efficiency would seem to provide doubtful readiness for uneconomic war. That one adversary may have the "best managed" military force structure in the world is little consolation if the other is victorious in war. Superior strategy, tactics, strength, and leadership, developed in arduous combat-oriented training over the years, will continue to win wars, irrespective of the economic efficiency of the forces involved.

### Combat Leadership

Effective combat leadership is fundamental to the successful prosecution of war. Such leadership in the Army requires inspirational direction of men on the battlefield. The leader focuses on the military objective—which may be a piece of terrain, a body of enemy troops, or the destruction of materiel. Quite properly, the combat leader is not concerned with the management of resources, business style, except perhaps in the areas of personnel and supply. Even then his concern for economy is directed to maximizing his capability to accomplish the military mission, and not to realizing economic efficiency and monetary savings from more effective management.

There must be a proper balance between time spent on the development of combat leaders and time spent on the development of efficient military managers. Dollars and cents are the

wrong criteria for evaluating combat leadership performance. Yet there seems to be considerable evidence that leadership training is being unduly diverted from its primary objective to an economic orientation. If this trend continues, a weakening of leadership potential for the future battlefield is inevitable.

Over-all military programing must be based on the requirements of national security. An acceptable program results from the considered judgment of civilian and military leaders, as to forces required in the face of the evaluated threat. Acceptability on the basis of dollars is obviously an improper condition. Absolute need, irrespective of cost, determines the proper criterion. Any lesser consideration would represent colossal blundering on the part of national leadership.

### Excessive Management

Recent controversies in this area suggest that there may have been excessive concern for economic considerations during the past decade. The burgeoning headquarters of the Defense Establishment, particularly in the fields of comptrollership, financial management, manpower control, and logistics management, bear witness to this phenomenon. The current reexamination of the defense posture of the United States is a healthy sign, so long as it focuses on needs first and costs next, rather than vice versa. Like proper development of combat leadership, military programs must be geared to optimum readiness for war, and must not become enamored of officious administration of programing itself.

As any good business manager knows, the additional administrative

personnel and supervisory levels required by an ever growing management superstructure are not only costly in manpower, but are also a hindrance in decision making. Such hindrance is significant in a nuclear age when immediate, aggressive reaction to a given situation may be mandatory. What is worse, this effect has filtered down to military units at all echelons, where increasing numbers of personnel have become involved in budgeting, accounting, reporting, and other administrative techniques to satisfy the requirements of the over-all management system. The crying need today is for combat-ready battle groups and divisions, not for an increasingly topheavy management superstructure. White collar personnel are necessary in optimum, not maximum, numbers. Otherwise, they are a poor substitute for "blue collar" frontline infantrymen.

### Present-Day Preparedness

There is no proof that management innovations of recent years will make us better prepared for war. Neither is there proof that they won't. Still, the arguments for "more management" must be looked upon with some trepidation, in view of what one school of thought considers less than commendable military performance in Korea. At the time of the Korean Conflict, some of the current emphasis on military management had already been instituted.

At any rate, military command must be on guard that it does not merely imitate business management, with its entirely different purposes. If this situation were to occur, we would soon have management of, by, and for itself. Under such conditions the military might be exceptionally well "man-

aged," but there would be serious doubt as to its ability to wage successful war.

Administration of military affairs must be put into proper perspective. When management ceases to contribute to combat readiness, or actually detracts from it, it loses its usefulness. Civilian and military leaders of our Defense Establishment ought to take a long, hard look at this problem. They should make certain that our military strength does not wither away, under pressure of the very emphasis on management which is currently supposed to improve it.

### A Suggested Remedy

Unfortunately, the tendency to consider command and management identical, and to use the terms interchangeably, continues, to the detriment of both. What is needed is a bold stroke of pen and tongue by our civil and military leaders. A suggested starting point is the elimination of such terms as "military manager" and "military management" in every instance where the terms "commander" and "command" are, in fact, the correct appellations under law and regulations. A second step might well be substitution of the word *administration* for

*management* to reflect more accurately the difference between public institutions and business enterprises.

These modest proposals will not affect in any way the application of proved business-management principles to military administration. Where appropriate, this certainly should be continued and, perhaps, even expanded. However, these proposals if adopted would help to discourage the use of business management precepts for the solution of all military administrative problems. They might even reverse the current drift toward management-for-management's-sake.

Most important of all, such changes would help to restore military command to its rightful position of honor, and cause it to be more sought after by the young men who, with or without command experience, will one day be the Nation's military leaders. These young men should have the opportunity to become experienced leaders—military commanders (not managers)—proud to uphold the great traditions of military command. In short, the military should officially recognize and heed an inescapable axiom: Command and management are not one and the same thing.

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Simply stated, the purpose of American military strength is to prevent war, to halt the expansion of tyranny, to help restrain any belligerence posing a serious threat to world order, and to achieve a quick and decisive victory in any conflict in which we might become involved.

The fact that the principal peacetime purpose of maintaining Armed Forces is to prevent war, coupled with the nature of the current worldwide threat and the great military power maintained by others, makes it absolutely essential that our Armed Forces offer a credible deterrent to all forms of war by being clearly able and ready to fight successfully any kind of war, anywhere, at any time.

*Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr, Jr.*

**NEEDED**—a new attitude for



# TEACHING MILITARY SCIENCE

Captain James E. Smith, Jr., *United States Army*

**T**HE Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) needs a philosophy of teaching, so that it may fulfill its function on the college campus of today. It is not enough for us to rely upon our proved training techniques, adhering strictly to the Army Training Program and to the subject schedules supporting that program. It is not enough to present a mechanically perfect class, a superbly trained drill team, or an excellent parade. We must add mind to the bone and muscle supporting the ROTC. The program requires a continuity of thought throughout all the courses.

We have been under attack for a variety of reasons for some years, often by the very colleges that offer the program as a part of their curricula. One of the reasons cited is that the "caliber of instruction" is low. This criticism usually provokes an indignant reaction from Army personnel, who spend a great deal of their time training troops in proved techniques. These techniques were developed, often in conjunction with college educators during World War II, to

train large numbers of troops in a short time, and have been improved over the years to meet changing needs. They are being used to train troops, in condensed programs, to handle the most complex equipment in fast-moving situations that simulate combat of the future.

So it is not unnatural for Army officers to feel that the criticisms are far from justified. These officers are professionals in the field of training. For the most part, they are possessors of college degrees, sometimes from the very school that they are serving. They are well-traveled, well-read, and curious about the world in which they live. They are responsible people who care about the status of the Nation—its approach to leadership, its moral standards, and its outlook for the future. They usually are a conservative group.

It would seem that such persons would be excellent instructors at college level—but something is reportedly lacking. It is sometimes said that ROTC programs are not college level courses, or that the level of teaching

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at its best does not approach that of college instruction. Having listened both to college instructors and to service instructors, I find this hard to believe. Some of the poorest instruction that I have experienced was college instruction. Some of the best—the most challenging—was Army instruction. I am sure that there are both superior and inferior instructors in both fields. From observation, it appears that the real problem springs from a difference in approach.

The Army *trains* people. The colleges *educate* people. What is the difference? The dictionary says that "to train is to make proficient by instruction and practice, as in some art, profession, or work (as to *train* soldiers)" also "to give the discipline and instruction, drill, and practice designed to impart proficiency or efficiency." "To educate" is defined as to "bring up, train, educate; also to develop the faculties and powers of by teaching, instruction, or schooling; qualify by instruction or training for a particular calling, practice. . . ." When a man is trained, he becomes proficient in a certain field. When a man is educated, he is taught to use his intellect in any field—to seek the facts and to use them as required by a given situation.

### Education or Training?

Our curriculum is designed to play a part in educating a man, if it is correctly understood and applied by the instructor. But if the instructor

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does not search beneath the surface of the Army Training Program and the appropriate subject schedules, he is going to train rather than educate. An opportunity to increase man's ability to understand and solve problems will thus be lost.

What then is missing? What should an instructor do before he steps to the platform? I believe that he must develop a philosophy of teaching at the college level, by studying the principles of teaching and of his field—military science. Philosophy may be defined as "the love or pursuit of wisdom." Wisdom, in turn, is defined as "the power of judging rightly and following the soundest course of action, based on knowledge, experience, understanding; good judgment, discretion; sagacity."

This requirement for wisdom cannot be restricted to the needs of military science—it reaches beyond the limits of our profession into many other fields. The instructor must become a student, studying constantly and keeping himself informed. This will include "picking the brains" of the college faculty, for there is much to be learned in a short period of time about the academic profession itself. He should consider and understand the philosophy of the college—what it stands for. He will wish to examine the background of the students and their levels of learning, so that he can instruct in a competent manner and even counsel these young men. In many cases there is a possibility of doing graduate work, of studying languages, or of undertaking other studies that will directly assist the officer in his career.

### The College Atmosphere

The new instructor may begin his research as soon as he receives his assignment—for it is a complete

change of pace, a new atmosphere, that he will experience. His new situation will be vastly different from that of the field unit, the headquarters, or the service school. His family will have to adjust to the life of the average civilian community.

An instructor can profitably read and digest a large amount of material—history, political science, philosophy, economics, military science, psychology, the natural sciences. The Army Contemporary Reading List is a good place to start. This list deals primarily with discussions of military policy—political, economic, military—that the instructor should understand in order to teach in several courses.

He will wish to acquire a deep understanding of the military ethic, as so ably presented by Dr. Samuel P. Huntingdon in his book, *The Soldier and the State*. *Soldiers and Scholars* by Lyon and Masland is a prerequisite for an understanding of certain educator attitudes toward the military services. Nowhere else does the professional soldier have an opportunity to peruse so many books of substance as he does on a campus where there is a fine library.

The military department, moreover, that does not build a respectable departmental library is failing to provide the specialized knowledge required for research. Budgets generally are small for such purposes; this calls for emphasis on quality, and on titles that are not to be found in the college library. A knowledge of current affairs and new developments in the military field is also required. Newspapers, news magazines, military periodicals, other periodicals with philosophical content, TV, and radio—all these are necessary for maintaining

contact with fast-changing situations in the world.

With this background, the officer instructor can prepare himself in the most important area of all: his understanding of the student and his background. No two colleges are alike and the instructor should proceed with care in establishing the instructor-student relationship. It first must be remembered that the student is a civilian and not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Almost all the students are preparing themselves for fields other than the military. Quite often, there is some resentment of the time required for "Rotsee." There is some feeling that military service will come soon enough, and that military education in college is an imposition. The wearing of the uniform—"conforming"—makes a student part of the mass. He fears losing his individuality in a community of individuals, all seeking different goals.

### The College Background

What conditions of discipline and obedience does the college impose upon him? What intellectual standards are set by the college? What moral or religious convictions are involved? What is the basic philosophy of the college pertaining to the student as an individual? What social pressures are exerted upon the student? What system of values is applied by the college to its charges? What background do the students share?

These questions are important with regard to placing the military department in its proper niche within a college. Each college is different; no common answer may be applied. It is clear, however, that the instructor can undertake considerable research, including much discussion with the

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student himself. This is simply to apply the old axiom, "Know your men."

Yet we try to bring students into the military structure without really opening the door to them. They are a different breed from ourselves in many respects. In background, sense of discipline, sense of duty, and sense of humor they differ from the man

inspire the student, and make him see that military education is important, not in the military field alone but in other fields of endeavor as well. He hopes to impress upon him the notion that even highly individualistic types must conform to a norm to a certain extent so that the group may exist in some semblance of harmony.

The instructor can provide superior



*US Army*

A crack ROTC drill team. Understanding the individual student—his needs, desires, and values—is the all-important factor to the military instructor.

who has served the public in uniform for 10 to 20 years. Often, this gap is not easily bridged.

The instructor will wish to observe the student, converse with him, and achieve a rapport with him. There should be understanding on the part of both the instructor and his students. The instructor ought to make the standards of the military service, as reinforced by his own convictions, crystal clear to the student. He must

leadership that will stimulate the student's desire to join in the work of those who have gone before him. Respect between instructor and student will grow on the basis of clear understanding of standards and motives. Once this relationship is established, and only when it is established, the officer is able to challenge the student to become the leader, to assume the responsibility of authority, and to act as a member of the team.

A third area important to the philosophy of the instructor is the relationship of the military department to other departments and to the faculty. We must never forget that our effort is only a fraction of the total expended in educating the student. The student who is seeking a commission receives approximately 10 percent of his education from the military department, and the student participating in only the basic course receives less than four percent. The point is that we must maintain our perspective in relation to demands upon his time and energy in meeting the requirements of our courses. This is no argument for turning soft, but rather for seeking the proper balance of study with outside work, and for realizing that we cannot preempt vital time needed for his major area of study.

### Instructor and Faculty

It is necessary to blend ourselves with the faculty, to receive the benefit of their experience in the field of education. Their knowledge of the student and his problems, and of the pitfalls of classroom teaching, can contribute greatly to our estimates of the situation. The officer instructor can inquire into the views of the instructors of other departments and, at the same time, he can express the philosophy of the Army. He can demonstrate the validity of our claim to being able to stimulate learning, and thus to educate the student. We have to prove ourselves, just as do any faculty members who join this professional group.

Many of our subjects overlap those of other departments, especially of the history and science departments. Here, there is the chance to reinforce the student's education by complementary instruction. This calls for a kind of coordination achieved only by


friendly cooperation with the other departments. Quite often, there will be an honest difference of opinion in the interpretation of some event or problem. All the better, for this will offer the student a well-defined argument, allowing him to make a judgment and to see that it is possible to make more than one interpretation of a given set of facts.

### Faculty Participation

The participation of other faculty members in specialized areas is valuable, either on the platform or in advising the officer instructor in his preparation for the platform. This participation will not be achieved by a standoffish attitude that refuses to see the application of the other areas of learning to the military. A military department accepted by the faculty as a part of the college family will receive strong support. The faculty can become the strongest and best recruiter for the ROTC outside the department itself. A professor of history, for instance, who is sympathetic toward the goals of the ROTC, may have a tremendous effect upon the student in his decision to enter upon the advanced course. The antipathetic professor may have an opposite effect.

It must be clear that understanding the individual student is all important—his needs, desires, and values. Without this understanding there is no chance of developing the group—the Corps of Cadets. Inevitably, there must be compromise; the needs of the individual must be measured against the needs of the group. These can be met with a sense of judgment, an acknowledgment of the problems involved in teaching at the college level, and the desire to participate in graduating a superior student and citizen.

# WAR ROCKETS



## From Ancient to Operational

Peter-Christoph Storm

*The rocket is neither an indispensable means of waging war nor will it ever replace cannon fire in any respect; however, it may be regarded as a useful auxiliary weapon which will be sadly missed if it is not available.\**

SINCE World War II an increasing number of surface-to-surface missiles have been assimilated by the artillery. With this development, a new era in the history of artillery approaches. After the long periods of the ballista in ancient times, the bombard in the Middle Ages, and the powder charge gun and barreled gun in modern times, we are now in the period of the rifled barrel and the rocket launcher. While the ballista, bombard, and powder charge gun are completely differing systems, the barreled gun and the rocket are closely related. The powder rocket is the forerunner and

companion of the powder charge gun.

Only future research and experience will determine whether the rocket eventually will supersede the barrel completely. However, it seems certain that the rocket launcher will be a characteristic weapon of future artillery. But before one looks into the future, one should try to understand the past and the present.

Because early medieval sources are obscure, definite distinctions between incendiary arrows, Greek fire, the incendiary charges of the catapult, and the later-developed powder charge weapons and rockets cannot be made. According to reports handed down to

*Translated from the original article which appeared in MITTEILUNGEN FÜR DIE RESERVEOFFIZIERE DER BUNDESWEHR, supplement to the March 1961 issue of WEHRKUNDE (Federal Republic of Germany).*

\* Konstantinoff's *Lectures sur les fusées de guerre*, Paris 1861.



posterity by Jesuit priests, a mixture which ignited and propelled an arrow was known in China as early as 969 A. D. Nevertheless, it may be assumed that pure saltpeter mixed with sulphur and charcoal was not known as a propelling agent before the 13th century.

There is evidence that the Arabs had knowledge of saltpeter around the middle of that century. A little later, the first formulas for gunpowder as pyrotechnic mixtures appeared in Europe. They were used for the manufacture of "flying fire" (Roger Bacon and Albertus Magnus) with which enemy riders could be scared and fortifications set on fire. With the "invention" of cannon, in the 1420's, the powder rocket lost its significance as a war weapon. Its use was confined to the production of spectacular fireworks. Artillerymen were engaged almost solely in that field from the end of the 15th century to the 18th century. They were very secretive about the art of firing rockets.

### Early Components

The main components of these rockets were the case, the propellant, the igniter, and a stick. The diameter of the rocket case was the caliber in inches. Rocket cases were at first formed of paper, and later of metal. The propellant was finely ground powder which was packed into the case by blows of a wooden mallet on a wooden tool fitting the bore of the case.

It can be assumed that in order to have as large an area of combustion as possible, the charge was placed into the case in such a manner that a conical cavity was left at the vent. A diaphragm was placed over the charge, and a hole bored through it for the fuse. Incendiary mixtures or fireworks compositions which were to

be ejected by the rocket were called "garniture." In order to stabilize the flight of the rocket, the case was fastened to a stick. Rules concerning measurement relations of the various parts were formulated. Measurements were stated in calibers.

### Signal Rockets

While incendiary rockets were still frequently used during sieges in the 15th century (for instance, Orleans 1428 and Constantinople 1453), their employment as war weapons waned steadily as time went by. Only in the 18th century did they draw some attention as signal rockets. Altitude experiments were made at that time, and fortresses were supplied with them as a means of communication.

In 1749 a three-inch signal rocket of an Englishman named Robins reached an altitude of more than 1,100 meters. It has been said that it was visible at a distance of more than 50 kilometers. Von Scharnhorst writes in his manual (1787) about similar tests by the Hanover artillery in the year 1786. Employment of signal rockets in fortresses is attested by an order of 12 June 1778 by Frederick the Great, according to which the fortress of Silberberg was to indicate with a certain number of rockets the time when the enemy crossed the border.

### Incendiary Rockets

In India incendiary rockets gained greater prevalence when Haidar Ali, ruler of Mysore, in 1776 equipped 1,200 men with rockets. These incendiary rockets consisted of iron tubes weighing three to six kilograms, filled with an incendiary composition. They were fastened to bamboo poles about 2.5 meters long. Their effect upon cavalry and elephants was remarkable. The son and successor of the ruler, Tipu Sahib, defended the town of



Seringapatam in Mysore for one month against the British with 5,000 of these rocket launchers, among other weapons. The English seized the town on 2 May 1799.

Knowledge of the rocket was never completely lost because of spectacular fireworks. Dillich in his *War Manual* (1689) stated that "rockets are fired more for pleasure than in earnest against the enemy. . . ." At the close of the 18th century Von Scharnhorst summarized the significance of rockets in war when he wrote in his manual that "one uses rockets for signals and one can set fire to villages and magazines with them." The siege of Seringapatam revived the second purpose.

#### Rocket Bombardment

Until the second half of the 19th century, most concern was with the three problematic aspects of artillery: the shrapnel, a form of spherical case shot; the rifled cannon; and the war rocket. The subject of war rockets had been brought up by Sir William Congreve (1772-1828), later Artillery General and Comptroller of the Laboratories at Woolwich. He had become acquainted with the rockets of Seringapatam, and after extensive experiments (1804-05)—at the conclusion of which the British Prime Minister Pitt was present—he employed his incendiary rockets for the first time in an attack on Boulogne.

Having failed in 1805, he succeeded one year later (8 October 1806) in assailing the town with about 200 rockets, weighing one and one-half kilograms each. All rockets were launched within a half hour period from 18 boats 2,300 meters from the town. However, reports concerning the success of the bombardment are conflicting. More significant and more

widely known was the bombardment of Copenhagen by the British (2-5 September 1807) when 40,000 rockets and 6,000 bombs destroyed approximately 300 buildings. This was the first large-scale employment of rockets in modern times.

#### Developments in Design

The cases of Congreve's incendiary rockets were made of sheet metal. Pointed fire caps with holes were affixed to the top. The caps contained the incendiary composition and a small grenade. The tail stick was tangentially attached to the case filled with the propelling charge. The average caliber was about nine centimeters. From this beginning, rocket development progressed rapidly.

After the bombardment of Copenhagen, the Danish Artillery Captain Schuhmacher found some of Congreve's rockets which had not ignited, and used them with a warhead. Congreve adopted this progressive idea, and replaced the incendiary cap with grenades, grapeshot, shrapnel, or flares. At the same time he eliminated the disadvantageous tangential mounting of the stick by screwing it into a plate which closed the end of the case. The plate was perforated to let the gas escape. While the side-stick rocket had to be launched from a guide groove, the centrally mounted rocket could be fired from a tube.

Both guiding systems were tripod-mounted—later, the heavier calibers were carriage-mounted (for instance, the French mountain howitzer carriage of 1830). By 1850 the French were using 5.4-centimeter field rockets which were salvo fired, six at a time, at ranges of 500 to 1,000 meters.

Congreve's incendiary rockets were not confined to firing from the sea. During the various campaigns of the British from 1808 to 1815, rocket units within the field artillery organization had only little success as compared with the barreled guns.

Great Britain's only contribution to the Battle of Leipzig was a "rocket brigade" (battery) which caused much amazement and repulsed a French infantry brigade at Paunsdorf (a village near Leipzig) on 18 October 1813. The British also launched some rockets in the Battle of Quatre Bras in 1815.

During the long period of peace after 1815, almost all artilleries adopted the Congreve rocket system and its improvements. Some countries

### Improvements by Von Augustin

The Austrian rocket artillery under the leadership of Baron Vincenz von Augustin (1780-1859) underwent special development. Von Augustin was commandant of the newly established War Rocket Institute from 1814 to 1817, and then he activated and commanded the Austrian rocket corps. In 1849 he became Director of Ordnance Services and Director General of the Artillery. He improved upon the warhead rocket of Schuhmacher, increasing the initial speed. The result was a short powerful propulsive flight path which made possible the construction of projectile rockets with extended free course of flight. In contrast, the *Congreve* rockets had a lower initial speed and a longer time of powered

In September 1814 the British forces employed *Congreve* rockets against the garrison of Fort McHenry in Baltimore harbor. The rockets whose "red glare" was so vividly described by Francis Scott Key in "The Star-Spangled Banner" were not signal flares but were actually war rockets carrying high-explosive warheads.—Editor.

—Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Sweden, Greece, and Denmark—activated rocketeer corps and rocket batteries. The rocket batteries had six to 12 rocket guns, and were similar in organization to the barreled gun batteries.

Like the barreled gun artillery, the rocket artillery was divided into foot batteries, field batteries, horse batteries, and mountain batteries. The foot batteries were designed for use from fortresses. British field rocket batteries had more than 200 rockets in each rocket cart. Mounted artillery men carried the rockets like pistols in special holsters. Sticks and mountings were fastened to the stirrup. In the mountain rocket batteries, the rockets were carried by mules.

flight. Besides Austria, Switzerland also adopted the Augustin rocket system, as did Greece in her war of liberation. In Bavaria and Württemberg, tests were made but the Augustin system was not adopted.

### An American Rocket

After Augustin's death, the Austrian artillery was the first to introduce the rotating rockets made according to the specifications of the American William Hale. These had been developed in 1844 and displayed at the 1867 World's Fair in Paris. That same year, Great Britain also abandoned the *Congreve* system in favor of the stickless *Hale* rocket. The *Hale* rockets were stabilized in flight by a spinning produced by the release

of gases from tangential vents in an auxiliary combustion chamber.

The advantages of these rockets were the elimination of the long rocket sticks and the increased effective range. However, the course of flight was still not very regular. For this reason the Prussian artillery retained the central-stick rocket system for their signal rockets, flares, and explosive rockets.

Austrian pyrotechnicians and rocketeers were combined into a rocket corps which in 1845 totaled three companies with a strength of 535 men. A rocketeer regiment was later organized from the corps, as a result of the Augustin Artillery Reform of 1854. In case of war it was to expand to

## Late 19th Century Rockets

In the battles against Montenegro (1838) and in the wars of 1848 and 1849 in Italy and Hungary, Austrian rocket batteries were employed with some success. The French employed rockets in the Crimean War. The quotation at the beginning of this article is from a report on the siege of Sevastopol (1854-55) by the French artillery. In the Italian War of 1859 Napoleon III had four rocket batteries and 61 barrel batteries.

The Austrians, likewise, employed rocket batteries. In the war of 1866 the Austrian Army had three rocket batteries in Bohemia. Rocket batteries were primarily part of the artillery reserve. In subsequent years, until the

Although not mentioned in this article, one of the early researchers in the field of modern rocketry was Dr. Robert H. Goddard, an American scientist who published a study in 1919, titled *A Method of Reaching Extreme Altitudes*. His research which continued until his death in 1945 is credited with laying much of the groundwork for the development of modern long-range rocket weapons and rocket-propelled flights. Dr. Albert Parry, in his book on *Russia's Rockets and Missiles* states that Dr. Walter R. Dornberger, who commanded the German rocket base at Peenemünde told him that even as late as 1936, "your Doctor Goddard and we the German military were at about the same point of rocket development."—Editor.

16 rocket batteries. These were to be utilized primarily as mountain artillery. One battery had 20 rocket guns with the necessary ammunition and cargo vehicles.

British mountain batteries in 1863 had either six barreled guns and two rocket guns or six rocket guns. When the Austrian rocketeer regiment received mountain guns in 1863, it was renamed the rocketeer and mountain artillery regiment. But the following year the batteries were distributed to other field artillery regiments and in 1867 final phase out of the rocket weapon was ordered.

close of the century, only the navy and artillery of Great Britain employed rocket guns in their various colonial wars (Canton 1858, Abyssinia 1868, Transvaal 1881, and East Africa 1895).

## Phasing Out of Rocket Artillery

When the Prussian artillery system (breech-loading gun), proved in three victorious wars, was introduced in all artilleries, the war rocket was almost completely withdrawn as a war weapon. Only in mountain war and colonial war were a few used, and in fortress war they remained as a means

## WAR ROCKETS

of signaling and illumination. The special rocket units were deactivated everywhere. At the time, there were some who were against the neglecting of the rocket system because they thought that it might in time replace barreled guns.

The rocket held some advantage over the barreled guns—an advantage which had justified the establishment of rocket batteries. Yet the expected tactical changes resulting from the employment of rockets in the battlefield did not materialize. In view of this fact, General Jomini was right when he stated in his *Précis de l'art de la guerre, 1837* that in spite of these rocket batteries he would re-

that even there they were being replaced by the electric light.

### Advantages Over Guns

One advantage of the rocket was the light weight of its launching device (the mount for the *Hale* rocket weighed 13 kilograms), which made it suitable for mountain warfare and colonial expeditions. Its light weight also made the choice of gun positions easier. In addition, the rocket had a psychological effect on living targets on the battlefield—targets such as cavalry, infantry, and the crews of the field artillery.

Incendiary rockets had some effect in fortress wars and sieges, especially

Rocket	Size	Range in meters
<i>Congreve</i>	3 kilograms (9 centimeters)	Up to 3,000
<i>Augustin</i>	3 kilograms (5 centimeters)	Up to 900
<i>Augustin</i>	6 kilograms (6 centimeters)	Up to 1,200
French	9.5 centimeters	Up to 3,000
<i>Hale</i> (Austrian)	2 kilograms	Up to 1,400
<i>Hale</i> (Austrian)	3 kilograms	Up to 900

tain the battalion column as the best form of infantry attack. This strategy was modified only after the adoption of towed guns and cannon by the Prussian company column.


Too much had been expected of the rockets, and soon there was no confidence in them. The disadvantages of the rockets, in relation to the improved barreled gun, outweighed their advantages to such an extent that further discussions about rockets as a war weapon were no longer considered worthwhile in military circles. The *Manual of Military Science* by Potent states, in 1879, that rockets were at that time being used only for illumination purposes during sieges, and

when fired from the sea. Nevertheless, Hoyer in his *Dictionary of the Artillery* deems iron incendiary balls more suitable (1812). The lack of explosive force on the warhead when fired made the rocket especially suitable as a carrier for special charges. The firing range of war rockets partly exceeded that of the smoothbore guns. Their speed of flight was lower (maximum up to 260 meters per second). The ranges were as shown on the chart.

### Disadvantages

After 1866 the artillery progressed from a close-range to a long-range system for which war rockets were inadequate.

Compared with the smoothbore weapons, rockets were inaccurate, their fire widely dispersed, and their reliability adversely affected by internal and external factors. These dif-



U.S. Army

#### The Pershing missile—a modern military rocket

ferences were even more striking when compared with the rifled barreled cannon. Furthermore, it was impossible

to store the rockets in a ready to fire condition and to manufacture them on a large scale.

In short, in spite of all efforts, it was not possible in the 19th century to make the rocket into a weapon which could seriously compete with the rifled barrel. As an "auxiliary weapon," it could at most supplement the smoothbore barrel for some decades.

#### Declining Use and Interest

Great Britain's Navy and artillery used *Hale* rockets until the beginning of the 20th century. On the Continent, the war rockets had been forgotten. Even though the firm of Krupp had a patent on war rockets from as early as 1910, they did not make use of it. Signal rockets remained in service. Illumination rockets within fortifications were replaced by electric spotlights. On the civil front, rockets were used in the sea rescue service, for harpoons, and as fireworks. During World War I, French, British, and Russian aviators occasionally carried, in addition to their pistols, light rockets as a weapon against captive balloons of the enemy.

The second revival of interest in the rocket did not come about until after World War I. It arose from the desire to penetrate space by means of rocket propellant (Ganswindt 1891, Ziolkovsky 1903, and Oberth 1924). By then, the rocket question occupied the minds of a large number of private scientists and scholars. It was only later that military authorities became interested.

#### Two Pathways of New Development

At the end of the 1920's, Germany began to turn to the rocket as a war weapon. Rocket artillery developed along two pathways, one leading to

chemical rockets, smoke rockets, and explosive rockets. After tests, smoke launchers were introduced in 1929. This weapon led to the creation of rocket units in World War II—units up to brigade strength, organized like the artillery. They especially were employed in the Russian Campaign. The Russian rockets used at that time became known as *Stalin Organs* (multi-barrel rocket launchers).

The other pathway led to the development of effective long-range warhead carriers. The construction of the V-2 (vengeance weapon), range 550 kilometers, by Dornberger and Von Braun was a first climax in the development of these rockets. After the war this effort was continued in the United States and in the USSR. The fast burning solid fuel was replaced by liquid fuel. However, the *Rheinbote* which was launched (approximately 220 times) against Antwerp after the middle of January 1945 was a four-stage powder rocket (a three-stage rocket with a booster) with a range of roughly 220 kilometers.

Just as the barreled gun of the

First World War—up to then a “monopoly” of the artillery—was adopted by other or newly established branches of service, the rocket weapon also did not remain only with the artillery. The artilleries of army and navy, the air force, and independent rocket units share in the organization, command, and employment of long-range rocket weapons. Rockets serve the antitank defense and antiair defense of all branches on the battlefield.

Rockets, for centuries the companion of the powder charge gun, took the first step toward supplementing or even replacing the barreled gun in the 19th century. Their inadequate technical features and the effective changes of the barreled gun artillery made them fall almost into oblivion. Finally, in the 20th century, with all the aids of technical progress, the rocket developed into a new war weapon which accentuates the picture of a new war. The war rocket is today no longer “a sadly missed” auxiliary weapon as it was 100 years ago, but a basic weapon of the artillery.

### US ARMY MISSILE COUNTDOWN

- 1944—The first US ballistic missile, a US Army *Private 'A'*, successfully fired.
- 1947—The Nation's first two-stage rocket, a V-2 with a WAC *Corporal* upper stage, successfully fired by the US Army to an altitude of 25 miles.
- 1951—The first successful intercept of a bomber in flight by a US Army *Nike Ajax*.
- 1953—*Redstone*, the Nation's first inertially guided ballistic missile, fired successfully.
- 1956—First deep penetration of space by a *Jupiter C* which reached to an altitude of 682 miles.
- 1957—The nosecone reentry problem was solved by the Army. A *Jupiter* nosecone recovered at sea.
- 1958—*Redstone* put *Explorer I*, the Free World's first satellite, into orbit around the earth.
- 1959—The first and only US space probe to orbit the sun, *Explorer IV*, was launched by the Army.
- 1960—*Nike Zeus*, first antimissile missile fired successfully. A *Hawk* air defense missile intercepted and destroyed a ballistic missile, proving the feasibility of killing a missile with a missile.
- 1961—*Redstone* rockets lifted the first Free World astronauts into space.—Editor.



# SWEDISH TOTAL DEFENSE

Colonel Sam Myhrman, *Swedish Army*

**S**WEDEN'S position between East and West, between the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and those of the Warsaw Pact, indicates the nature of her defense problems in today's restless world. In the west, Sweden stretches alongside Norway and very close to Denmark—both NATO countries. In the east, her land boundary stretches 400 kilometers in length, and only the Baltic Sea separates her from Poland, East Germany, and the Soviet-dominated Baltic States.

Furthermore, if one draws a transpolar "highway" connecting the whole of the United States with the whole of European Russia—as shown on the accompanying map—Sweden can be seen to extend across more than half of the "border area" or buffer zone between the two great powers.

As to Sweden's geography and population, a comparison with Great Britain may be useful. In contrast with Britain's 244,000 square kilometers land surface area (including Northern Ireland), Sweden has an area almost twice as large—440,000 square kilometers. In population, however, Britain has 50 million inhabitants and Sweden little more than seven million, or approximately one-seventh as many. As to the density of population, there are 207 persons per square kilometer in England, but in Sweden only 17—a ratio of 13 to 1.

With respect to total defense, the described conditions are a disadvantage as well as an advantage to Sweden. The larger an area, the more dif-

ficult is its military defense, especially in our time of vast, modern battlefields. However, the larger the area is in proportion to its population, the more possibilities there are of reducing by dispersion the number of lives lost. This holds especially true if one reckons with the employment of weapons of mass destruction.

It must be added that geological conditions in Sweden accommodate the construction of mountain shelters and fortifications. In Sweden it is almost a matter of course to build a fortification, command shelter, storage room, or industrial installation into granite, if durability is needed and the best possible protection is to be given.

## The Policy of Neutrality


There are also political factors to be considered. Sweden's politics have been determined for some time by the principle of neutrality, although in 1948-49 Sweden was willing to deviate from this traditional policy. At that time the Scandinavian countries negotiated to establish a Scandinavian Defense Alliance—at any rate Sweden did. However, Denmark and Norway chose another road; they aligned themselves with NATO. After the failure of the negotiations, Sweden returned to her policy of neutrality.

*Translated from the original article which appeared in WEHRKUNDE (Federal Republic of Germany) April 1961.*

*Colonel Myhrman is Head of the Swedish Defense College.*

There are five political parties in Sweden: the Conservative (right-wing), the Liberal (*Folk Parti*), the Center (Farmer's Union), the Social Democratic, and the Communist. The Communists have only a few seats in the *Riksdag* (National Legislature). All other parties, commonly referred to as the "democratic parties," agree in principle that both Sweden's position and her policy of neutrality de-

sor in an attack must far outweigh any probable gain. Should the country be attacked in spite of such defenses, the guiding principle is that "No part of the country may be given up without tough, relentless resistance." Beyond this principle is the last and ultimate thought that Sweden—if she should be attacked—must be able to survive the first assault, to be in a position to receive help from that part



mand a strong defense. Discussions have not centered around the question of whether Sweden should have a strong defense, but rather the question of how strong the defense should be and how best to organize and equip it.

### Swedish Defense Aims

The objective agreed upon by the democratic parties is this: The defense must be so strong that it will have a peace-maintaining effect. The probable cost and losses of the Aggres-

of the world which has not been attacked.

There is no doubt that modern total war requires total defense. The civilian, as well as the soldier, must be included in the defense effort. For more than 10 years past, every responsible Swede has been aware that each able-bodied citizen must bear his share of the defense burden, not only by paying taxes, but also by being ready to undertake a task in war.

The total defense of Sweden usually is broken down into the following

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Review

major categories: military, civil, economic, and psychological. It goes without saying that persons representing these categories must work hand-in-hand in preparing for war, that no sharp line can divide these groups, and that "no chain is stronger than its weakest link."

### Distribution of Responsibility

A basic rule of total Swedish defense can be expressed as follows: Each office which has a responsibility for a certain activity in peacetime shall retain that responsibility in wartime. This means that each office is responsible within its own field of activity for war planning and all other preparations for war. The management of the Swedish state railroads, for instance, is responsible for the operation of the railroads in peacetime. Therefore, it is also responsible for that function in wartime, and thus responsible for planning and preparing for war in the field of rail transportation.

Here, the first problem of Swedish total defense is encountered. Do the civil authorities and offices have the real ability to solve war-planning and war-preparing problems? The personnel of the armed forces, and especially their command organs, are constantly and solely occupied with preparations for a war mission. They practice, train, and plan. Of course, there are a number of tasks and training requirements geared to peacetime; however, the danger of war is the foremost concern.

### Role of the Civil Sector

In contrast, peacetime missions, as a rule, are the primary concern of the civil sector. Employment and allocation of personnel are based essentially on the workload in peacetime. At the beginning of the forties, the civil sec-

tor frequently was of the opinion that war, war preparations, and war planning were matters only for the military. But there has been a sweeping change. This is largely explained by the persistent work of enlightenment on the part of the military authorities. No civil authority in Sweden today should doubt the legitimacy of its responsibility for war preparation.

From this point to the execution, however, is a long way. Nevertheless, one authority after another has recognized its responsibility and contributed its share, so that the Swedish total defense has become *total* in the true sense of the word.

### Experiences From Practice

The decisive factor has been the large number of exercises involving both military and civil authorities—exercises which by now can be considered routine.

At present, Reserve training for military personnel is conducted once every six years. This requirement also holds for the regional military staffs who work with the civil authorities at staff level. Within each military district the defense staff is a military territorial staff. Each military district is the counterpart of a district under civil administration, a Swedish administrative district. Thus a president (governor) of an administrative district (one of the 24 Swedish provinces) has an opportunity every six years to perform his war tasks with his provincial government.


Participation in such an exercise compels the civil officials concerned, along with their staffs, to visualize again and again their own war task. Furthermore, they are assisted in keeping their war planning up to date by means of various inspections and lectures.



**SWEDEN'S LONG AND RUGGED COASTLINE DEMANDS HIGHLY MOBILE  
AND VERSATILE DEFENSE FORCES**

*All photos courtesy of Royal Swedish Emb*





SWEDEN'S LAND, AIR, AND NAVAL FORCES

STAND IN CONSTANT READINESS ON HER BORDERS



### Military-Civil Cooperation

In principle, the system functions well and the Swedish civil preparation for war is adequate. Rome, of course, was not built in a day. It seems justifiable to mention, however, that only a few countries in the world hold Sweden's view that military-civil cooperation in war must be exercised, tested, prepared, and planned continually in peacetime. If civil and military chiefs, with their staffs, can confer on an equal basis, and if doing so is considered natural and a matter of course, the foundation stone for the best total war efforts has been laid. In a country such as Sweden, which has an over-all defense plan, the necessary military-civil cooperation presents no problem.

### Personnel Requirements

Exploitation of the Swedish population potential during war is regulated primarily by the three so-called liability laws: the conscription law, the civil defense law, and the service law. The oldest and most basic of these is the conscription law, which provides that each Swedish male between 19 and 47 years of age is subject to military service. Roughly calculated, this provides approximately one million men eligible for service. Because of the great area of the country, theoretically this total strength would have to be utilized to meet military personnel requirements. But today's total defense demands, at least to a limited extent, employment of male personnel (of military age) within other than purely military fields.

### Draft Exemption

In a modern country there is no civilian activity, essential in war, which could get along without some draft age male personnel. This is es-

pecially true of key professions such as engineering and industrial management. In a country with limited personnel reserves, it may be difficult to decide whether a certain man should remain in his civilian position, should be utilized in civil administration, or should be drafted into the armed forces.

In principle, Sweden has solved this problem by passing a law exempting certain specialists from military service. Men who have had special training, however, and who have served in higher command capacities during their term of service are normally excluded from exemption. Needless to say, these men may also be important in a civil war-planning office. By military-civil cooperation, attempts are made to solve these problems individually, case by case.

### Quality Requirements

The quality of the total defense of a country depends upon many factors. Equipment, as well as personnel, must be first class. This requires that the neutral country either manufacture or import weapons and equipment of a quality equal to those of the enemy. Both manufacture and purchase require the provision of adequate finances.

Therein lies the most decisive problem for today's Sweden. During the years immediately after the war, the Swedish nation supplied all of her own essential war materials. However, the development of technical warfare has progressed so rapidly during the last 10 years that the national resources have seemed less and less adequate. Home production of a new weapon, or more correctly a new "weapon system," will soon become too expensive.

This holds especially true in the field of long-range guided missiles.



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Sweden's forces are specially trained and equipped for the terrain over which they operate

Therefore, Sweden has been compelled to import the weapon systems required by her armed forces. The country thus has become dependent upon international good will in that respect.

#### Scientific Research Needed

It is not enough that there are opportunities to purchase. It is necessary to evaluate what is offered for sale. In Sweden's case this calls for continuous research, keeping pace with studies and developments in foreign countries. Sweden must do research especially in fields wherein secrecy precludes customary insight into trade. This must be done in order to know where to buy the best and the cheapest.

#### Preparedness Requirements

Combat-ready naval units and air forces are on constant alert around the globe. Alerted land forces stand by in the east as well as in the west as permanent units.

How has Sweden solved the problem which such preparedness creates? The training system of the navy and air force guarantees that combat-ready units are available at all times. All squadrons of the air force can be compared with corresponding units of NATO, in preparedness. Excluded are those units which are utilized for continuous personnel training, or which are retraining in new types of aircraft. Part of the navy is always combat-ready. The men under compulsory training as crews are exchanged with new inductees at various times. In preparedness of personnel, the Swedish forces can stand comparison with corresponding foreign units.

In the army, however, the Swedish system differs considerably from the systems of the East and West blocs. Sweden has no permanent standing army units. At certain times of the year—when the initial training of the inducted age group approaches the

end—these 40,000 men are an alert force well worth having. As mentioned before, one-sixth of the army organization trains each year.

Steadily increasing demands have caused the Swedish Army Command to propose improvements in army readiness. More frequent Reserve exercises have been recommended, as have changes of the times of induction. These proposals are presently being evaluated by the Swedish Government.

### The Mobilization System

As compared with other national programs, the Swedish system of preparedness in its present form lacks many elements, especially where army preparedness is concerned. Nevertheless, there are facts which argue in favor of the Swedish system. In principle, it is right for the Swedish situation. The expanse of the country requires quantity of land forces, but the limited economic resources do not permit standing elite forces of significant size. A brief glance at the map of Sweden shows that our problem of preparedness concerning land forces cannot simply be solved by the system of "standing forces."

### Artillery Readiness

The problem of preparedness for the army and coast artillery forces was solved in a manner other than that used in the neighboring Scandinavian countries, Denmark and Norway. Briefly summarized, the solution is: swift and decentralized mobilization, and immediate readiness upon activation of the war organizations. Such readiness demands—as already mentioned—successive training of the Reserves within the war unit so that the unit can be considered combat ready at any time.

Fast mobilization is based on local

recruiting, which is organized to the minutest detail. Apart from the Home Guard, which functions as a mobilized security and control unit, no Swede subject to compulsory service has a weapon or any other personal equipment in peacetime. But there are adequate supplies of equipment in each village, in each community, and in each area in which a war unit is to be activated. Consequently, at the time of mobilization a war unit does not move into barracks. The men report instead to the equipment depots, which are located so that the men can reach them on foot or bicycle within a short time.

The segments of the navy and air force which are not immediately combat ready are organized on the same principle as the army. This system too has been practiced and tested.

The fastest type of draft is notification by radio. In order to simplify this procedure and to render variations of draft feasible, the induction orders bear certain notations and keywords. By announcing on the radio, for instance, that "Blue 21" is to proceed immediately to the location stated on the induction order, it is theoretically possible to have a certain unit combat ready quickly at the place of mobilization.

### Sweden's Will of Resistance

For a country such as Sweden, which has been fortunate enough to enjoy nearly one and a half centuries of peace, the question of power of resistance is an ever-growing problem. The nation has no war experience. During the so-called years of preparedness—the period of World War II—events now and then occurred in the vicinity of Sweden or within her boundaries which conveyed a mild image of the hardships of war. Never-

theless, the nation experienced in the years of preparedness only personal inconveniences, such as bothersome drafts for military standby duty, and comprehensive rationing measures.

How would the Swedish people react if Sweden should be hit by war? Would they become panicky and bury their heads in the sand like ostriches? Fortunately, there is no evidence to indicate that the Swedish nation would take such an attack worse than would other nations. Members of Sweden's armed forces volunteered for service during the war, especially in Finland. Since the war they have demonstrated in international service that they can stand comparison with the soldiers of other nations.

Swedish civil officials likewise have shown that they can master the art of improvisation at home as well as abroad or in international service. It can rightly be assumed that the Swedish people could endure the shock of a war and the outbreak of war as well as could the population of war-experienced countries. The historic tradition is significant in this connection, in spite of the long state of peace. Historical studies reveal that the Swedish people act against war and its demands by drawing closely together, and by taking a positive attitude when the nation's existence is at stake. Such situations have, in the past, produced a unified nation, with amazing results.

### Research of Opinions

In the sphere of psychological defense, there is in Sweden during peacetime the Office for Psychological Defense. During recent years this office has made surveys of the Swedish will of resistance, and has published the results. The surveys indicate that

there has been a declining tendency in the will of resistance.

However, it is open for argument whether a poll conducted in peacetime will reflect a realistic picture of the will of resistance at the outbreak of war. There are good indications that the attitude of the population will be quite different from that of peacetime, when cold facts present the choice of fighting or surrendering.

Lack of objective information probably contributes to the indifferent attitude toward defense which is found here and there. Pacifistic and nihilistic elements, indifferent toward defense, have in today's Sweden found elbowroom in the press and in the general debates. On the other hand, objective military information has at times been exposed to attacks and suspected of being biased.

### The Question of Nuclear Weapons

The Swedish military has strongly advocated that Swedish defense must have access to tactical nuclear weapons as soon as possible. Utilization of other nuclear weapons has never been opened for discussion by the military; the strategy of Swedish defense has never been discussed from any other point but that of the strategic defensive.

The purchase of nuclear weapons in foreign countries in the foreseeable future seems unlikely. The only other possibility is production within the country. Scientists favor this possibility, and believe that limited production would be feasible at the close of the sixties.

However, the nuclear weapons debate has, unfortunately, assumed emotional and political aspects. Opponents of the nuclear weapon have, to a large extent, carried the question of weapon procurement away from the purely

## TOTAL DEFENSE

objective level. Irritating debates on this subject have been conducted in the press as well as in political circles. Objective technical military information activities have been hindered, inasmuch as military regulations order that "military information activity must be conducted in a manner which precludes interpretation as intervention in political debates."

### Home Production of Nuclear Weapons

The government chose to put this question "on ice" for the time being. The day is rapidly approaching, however, when an unexpressed position will mean a conscious delay of the production program.

Since the only imaginable form of procurement is home production, which can show results at the earliest by the end of the sixties, Swedish defense faces today the serious problem of maintaining itself in the nuclear age during a period of transition. It is a symptom of the sound Swedish will of resistance that all responsible authorities and the majority

of the population do not regard the situation as hopeless, but as a problem which must be solved no matter how difficult.


A change of the basic defense principle—that no part of the country may be given up without tough, relentless resistance—is out of the question. This principle must hold even if an enemy employs nuclear weapons in his tactical operations. The probability that he will do so is enhanced by the steadily increasing access to these weapons.

Swedish defense will encounter great and increasing difficulties in performing its task as long as the country forgoes developing her own tactical nuclear weapons. The firepower superiority of the enemy will continue to increase. The consequence will be a more precarious tactic and a decreased power of resistance.

### Foreign Opinions

An attack against a good organized defense calls for comprehensive planning. An essential but difficult part is

SAAB J-35B Mach 2 plus jet fighter used by Sweden's Air Forces



the estimation of the defending country's will of resistance. Although the will of resistance is not a static entity, Sweden's attitude is expressed in a government order of the forties, which is still valid today: Any information suggesting nonresistance is false.

In connection with German plans for attacking Sweden in 1943, it has been implied that the German Intelligence Service rated the Swedish will of resistance to be low. The Swedish Government and military leaders, in 1943, were of a contrary opinion. The will of resistance, they believed, was rising rapidly and strongly. For one thing, Swedish draftees and volunteers had seen the possibilities of Sweden's defense tactic in the northern territory, and had observed the problems which Finland posed for the German units.

It will never be possible to determine who was right in 1943—the German Intelligence Service or the Swedish Government. But one should never underestimate the significance of confidence in one's own capabilities and in the righteousness of one's cause.

### **The Swedish Defense Strategy**

During the early forties and the years since, the porcupine at times has symbolized the Swedish defense strategy. The symbol is suitable inasmuch as the Swedish defense has been built up with sharp "erectile defense spines" toward all sides. Today's total defense reflects in this respect the Swedish no-pact alliance attitude.

In contemplating the Swedish non-alignment policy of total defense, however, it should not be forgotten that the majority of the Swedish people,

belonging to the west European culture community, believe with all their hearts in the rights of democracy and in human freedom.

In another respect the porcupine is not a true symbol of the Swedish idea of defense. The porcupine, although a fearful animal when it rolls into a ball and erects its quills, cannot protect itself from being run over if it happens to be in the way of a steam-roller. The planning of Swedish defense today goes a step beyond that of the porcupine—to survive the first deadly blow and then to go on living. In the civil sector, extensive plans for the evacuation of our cities and densely populated areas have been made. Critics have contended that this constitutes a violent invasion into normal living, but they become silent when asked for alternative proposals.

As long as the world is so evil that it threatens densely populated areas with mass destruction weapons, to break the will of resistance of a country or to clear vital traffic routes, a small nation with a vast geographical expanse has but one choice, namely a comprehensive plan for evacuation.

The Swedish strategy—it may be stated in conclusion—is defensive, but the reader should not conclude that the moment of offensive has not been considered. The moment of offensive will be exploited to the utmost in all sectors, in any manner and in all cases in which the Swedish defense strategy has prepared way for it. Today's Swedish armed forces train for a tactical-offensive employment, for which the Swedish land features, the Swedish granite, and the Swedish will to defend goods and chattels provide the prerequisite stability.



# GUERRILLAS WITHOUT MORALE

## The White Russian Partisans

Colonel William A. Burke, *United States Army*

**P**ARTISAN or guerrilla warfare, unless it is motivated by patriotism and animated by political and moral ideals, may be subject to the same failures and defeats as any other type of modern warfare. The Belorussian (White Russian) partisans of World War II are widely reputed to have been among the most effective non-regular forces to fight against the German Army. This view, established in large part by the USSR as useful propaganda, is only partially true. As a matter of fact, Belorussian guerrillas fought both for and against the Germans, as well as against Russia and among themselves. The record of Belorussian partisan activity—even though it is imperfectly known to Western historians—provides an illuminating instance of confused and incoherent guerrilla activity.

The history of Belorussia, now known as the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR), one of the 15 Soviet "republics," is a long record of disaster and catastrophe. Situated on the western edge of Greater Russia, Belorussia has been repeatedly overrun by the armies of France, Germany, and Russia during the past centuries. Although its population of eight million makes it the third largest ethnic group in the USSR, it has been little known as a national or ethnic unit outside the Slavic world. The majority of Belorussians have in the

past seemed apathetic to political questions, and relatively backward in political, social, and cultural development.

Except for a few days during the two World Wars, there has been no independent Belorussian state to which the more nationalist-minded citizen could point as an ideal to be regained. Even the wartime "independent state" was merely permitted to exist by occupying powers who were busy elsewhere.

Belorussian "resistance groups," however, have been organized and employed by both the Germans and the Russians. Dominance over the members of such groups appears to have been the chief aim of the organizers. Manipulation by stronger powers for their own ends has characterized the history of Belorussia, as the region has changed hands successively among its neighbors.

Ever since the 17th century, each successive controlling or occupying power has striven by all means known to man to assimilate the Belorussian population to its own culture, and to suppress every manifestation of Belorussian nationalism.

To ensure the success of this ruthless program, all noteworthy aspects of a distinctively Belorussian culture were stamped out repeatedly. Nationalist-minded intelligentsia and forward-thinking students were purged



over the years. Even the language was banned on occasion, or its use restricted. As the Belorussian masses were mostly illiterate, and culturally oriented toward either Russia or Poland, it is easy to understand their acquiescence in this systematic destruction of everything "Belorussian."

As a result of this subjugation, Hitler's onslaught against the Soviet Union in 1941 was accepted by the Belorussians with understandable relief. Having cowered under the tyrannical rule of their stronger neighbors for as long as any living Belorussian could remember, they thought that their future could not but improve. Instead of an improvement, however, the war brought a new, but familiar, totalitarian rule in the form of German and, ultimately, Red Army occupation.

#### Nationalist Motivation

Under such conditions, few, if any, countries had ever possessed the historical motivation of Belorussia to rise with new-found vigor and violently combat these new aggressors in an effort to gain the independence so ruthlessly denied them during the past several hundred years. The field was set, it remained only to see who were the stronger players—the native guerilla defenders, or the invading aggressors.

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When German reconnaissance units entered Minsk and parachutists landed in the environs, that portion of the Red Army concentrated in Belorussian territory began a headlong retreat eastward. The more nationalist-minded Belorussian intelligentsia began collaborating immediately with German occupation forces, in the hope that liberation from Red rule would be tantamount to achieving Belorussian independence.

To understand this immediate and willing cooperation more fully, it is necessary to turn back to 1939. That year saw the destruction of Poland and an increase of Belorussian emigration to Germany. The *émigrés* formed the Belorussian National Center, which attempted to influence the German Government to take cognizance of Belorussian aspirations toward independence.

The center sent a memorandum to Hitler expressing such aspirations, and warning against a repetition of the mistakes of the Kaiser and of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. The German Government assured the center that the memorandum would be given serious consideration. Thus when the Germans invaded the USSR, Belorussia, counting on a modification of Hitler's announced policy that all of eastern Europe was "living space" for the German people, entered the struggle with the aim of achieving its own political autonomy.

Confidence in Hitler grew when the first German units distributed notices announcing that Belorussia would be the sole "living space" of the Belorussian people. This propaganda, as it turned out, did not in any way modify Hitler's earlier announced aspirations of gaining control of the entire area for the German people.

### German Support

Belorussian leaders began to assume certain responsibilities of organization and administration, tacitly supported by the German command. Belorussian military units were organized to resist the diversions of the Communist partisans and to protect strategic lines of communications.

Although painfully slow and weak in the beginning, this movement provided the needed impetus for the Belorussians' first steps toward normal community, cultural, and educational life. In the area of manufacturing, however, the Germans took over the former Communist socialized plants completely, affording no possibilities for the Belorussians to develop private industry.

The more concessions the fledgling Belorussian administration obtained, the more "rope" it took. Mild protests were even formulated against the German severance of the western and southern territories from Belorussia. Two underground organizations, the Party of Belorussian Independence and the Belorussian People's Front, were formed to discourage and combat collaboration. Discontent grew. Small though their numbers were, the activities of these groups became a thorn in the side of the occupation, and it was not unnatural that the moment soon came when the Germans cracked down on them.

In the summer of 1942 the Belorussian committees that had assumed too strong a nationalistic hue were dissolved by the Germans, and their leaders either were deported to Germany or shot. Belorussian emblems and flags were removed from public buildings, and local police were ordered to accept the SS command or to disarm. Repression of the Belorussian move-

ment was swift and ruthless, and by 1943 only those nationalists whose German loyalty was above suspicion were left in office or at liberty. Needless to say, these were given strong reminders as to which master they were serving.

### Anti-German Guerrillas

Here and there, in the woods and swamps, small guerrilla groups began to appear, and attempts were made to organize them to combat the occupation forces. This meager patriotic movement, however, had little chance to develop, due to lack of organization, ideological maladjustment, and lack of support by the masses.

Meanwhile, as early as autumn of 1942, the Soviets had taken a first major step in reprisal by parachuting Communist operatives into the German rear in eastern Belorussia. These operatives were to establish the military and political leadership necessary for the organization of a Moscow-directed partisan movement. As their organization developed, these Communist partisans became highly skilled at destroying communications lines, burning installations and supplies, and killing not only members of the German occupation forces, but Belorussians as well.

Caught in the ever-tightening German-Soviet vise, Belorussian national activists withdrew to remote areas of the country in an attempt to organize for their struggle against Germans, Russians, and Poles alike. However, with neither material support nor central leadership, the movement was unable to achieve an adequate level of development. The few Belorussian political leaders whom the Germans allowed to remain in office attempted to strengthen their case through diplomatic channels, but to no avail.

## The German Retreat

During the latter part of 1943 the German Army began its retreat before the advancing Communists, who had already occupied the Ukraine and were preparing for the onslaught against Belorussia. This increased the tempo of Belorussian demands, and forced the German authorities to take cognizance of the adverse conditions which confronted the occupation forces themselves.

The Belorussians, therefore, were allowed to create a Central Assembly which mobilized a Belorussian national defense of some 36,000 soldiers in March 1944. To regulate its national representation of Belorussia, the assembly called the Second All-Belorussian Congress in Minsk in June 1944. This was attended by 1,039 delegates from all parts of the country, representing all classes of people. The Congress with patriotic fervor reaffirmed, among other things, proclamations of a similar Independence Congress of 1918 for the Belorussian National Republic. It annulled all international treaties which called for either the division and the annexation or both of Belorussia. It reestablished a national representation of Belorussia and the Belorussian people in the form of the Belorussian Central Assembly. Most significantly, it expressed determination to break with Communist Russia in all respects.

The Soviet Army, however, had already crossed the border and was pressing the Germans all along the Eastern Front. As a result, the assembly was compelled to withdraw from the country before the violent assault of the Soviet forces. It went into exile in Germany, to continue the struggle for liberation from Soviet Russia. Part of the newly established

Belorussian national defense force was sent to the front against the Soviet armies, and was later reorganized into the First Belorussian Division. Groups also were parachuted into the rear areas of the Soviet forces, but their meager successes were far from noteworthy.

## Nazi Errors

In antagonizing the passive masses, the Nazi forces had spelled their own doom. In this connection two acts of the Germans are worthy of mention. The first was the recall of the freed Prisoners of War to prisoner of war camps; and second, the drafting of native labor for use in Germany.

To escape these policies, thousands of Belorussians fled to the woods. Soon their numbers were doubled by refugees from cities and towns where the labor draft for Germany had begun. The total number of this swamp and forest population is unknown, but it might be estimated at several tens of thousands by the end of 1942. Having no unity of purpose except survival and vengeance, they lacked the leadership and support necessary to make them a formidable threat to the German rear.

The story of the guerrilla warfare that developed against this background has undoubtedly been obscured and distorted by the Soviet press. Insofar as it is possible to judge on the basis of somewhat more than a cursory study, it appears that the movement only gradually and reluctantly fitted into the Soviet pattern. The claim that the Soviet agents had themselves created it seems unwarranted. In fact, the credit should be given to the Germans themselves.

Evidence indicates that the first guerrilla forces in Belorussia were nonpolitical groups, each merely fight-



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ing for its own physical survival; otherwise they remained conspicuously inactive. Such groups preyed upon the local peasantry long before they turned their arms against the Germans. Initially, the peasants willingly supplied them with food and clothing. Later, as their numbers grew, they began to raid the villages for their needs, which earned for them the nickname of "wood demons." For protection from these "patriotic" forces the peasantry turned to the Germans, but to no avail.

### **Collaborators versus Guerrillas**

Little evidence can be found to indicate the existence of Belorussian nationalist guerrillas. A certain number of Belorussian nationalists collaborated with the Germans. They treated all guerrillas as anti-Belorussians.

Mention is made in some Belorussian literature of the existence of sizable groups, allegedly fighting both the Germans and the Soviets for a free and independent Belorussia. Neither concrete evidence of this, nor evidence that "Belorussian ideology" was the motivating factor for these nationalist guerrillas, has been made public. Little mention is made anywhere of Belorussian emblems, flags, or insignia being used by the guerrillas; the aims of most were their own survival, and a determination to be "neither German, Soviet, nor Polish." Nor could all of them be called "guerrillas" in the proper sense of the word.

N. P. Vakar, a leading authority on the matter, has described the guerrillas as follows:

*These groups were most prevalent in the Belorussian forests at the end of 1943. They could neither articulate nor promote any program, and apparently all they wanted was to be left alone. Soviet guerrillas avoided fighting them so as not to push them*

*into the German camp. They called themselves guerrillas but—cave men of modern times—they used arms only when attacked in their dugouts. There were also 'wild' units fighting the Soviets, the Germans, and one another at the same time.*

Mr. Vakar has quoted the personal reminiscence of a Belorussian national:

*People of military age, deprived of the chance to live and work in peace, felt lost and betrayed. They were anti-Stalin, and wanted to join hands with those who were fighting him. They enrolled in antiguerrilla units but, realizing that they had to fight for the Germans and against their own people, deserted and joined the anti-German guerrillas. Thus many young people changed sides several times.*

### **The Soviets Return**

The Soviets set out lures for the larger guerrilla groups: supplies, trained leadership, and pardon for political sins. Soviet instructors had the task of coordinating and directing anti-German operations, and of convincing the population that through Soviet efforts their country was being rid of the hated German occupation.

Both leaflets and radio broadcasts were used toward this end; rumor mongering was initiated, and covered all subjects from promises to abolish collective farming to promises of religious freedom. These activities, combined with the fact that the German rout had begun on all fronts, prompted many to join the guerrillas in order to be on the safe side. The Soviets began raiding villages in a forced recruiting campaign; those who refused to join the guerrillas were shot as German agents. Needless to say, the guerrilla units swelled with new recruits.

The reconstituted units were headed by a uniformed Soviet commander and a political commissar. Members were forced to take an oath of loyalty to Moscow; criticism of the Soviet Union became a punishable crime. Soviet field presses were established to print literature appealing to Belorussian "patriotism," emphasizing the blood kinship of the Belorussian, Ukrainian, and Russian peoples, and denouncing nationalists who collaborated with the Germans as "traitors to the Belorussian people."

### Soviet Propaganda

Even before the end of World War II, the Soviets began to tell the Free World about the presumably great effectiveness of the "White Russian Partisans" in combating fascism. Such reports, of course, make up a typical sort of Soviet propaganda.

Since the war, on the other hand, it has become fashionable to believe that this patriotic effectiveness still exists as a latent nationalistic spirit which if roused might even throw off the yoke of Moscow. Although such revolt might be possible in other areas presently under control of the Soviet Union, it is not, in fact, likely to occur in Belorussia.

In assessing the actual ineffectiveness of the White Russian partisans, one must not overlook the fact that they were not motivated by an extreme nationalistic belief. The majority were not nationalist-minded volunteers from the local population, but personnel from German-encircled Red Army units, deserters from several different armies, and dedicated Belorussian Communists. Physical survival, rather than a political or nationalistic objective, appears to have provided the motive of these bands.

One must concede that a degree of

nationalistic spirit has been fanned into effectiveness each time Belorussian territory has been liberated from totalitarian control and occupied by a Western European power. The Belorussians, for example, welcomed the arrival of both the forces of Napoleon and those of Hitler. However, the policies of these occupation forces eventually embittered the natives to the point where their initial allegiance again swerved.

### Lack of National Spirit

One must realize, moreover, that not since World War II has Belorussian nationalism, or any other motivation for that matter, assumed the initiative and displayed itself as it has in Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. The spirit of nationalism (that identity of a people with the common idea of nationhood) has always plagued the Soviet Empire, and doubtless will continue to be a serious source of trouble. But total Soviet power now obtains in the BSSR, and prospects for substantially altering these conditions do not appear to be bright.

After the reoccupation of Belorussia in July 1944, Soviet Russia reestablished the BSSR in its pre-World War II likeness. The one thing new has been the admission of the BSSR to the United Nations as an independent state and a founding member. The BSSR, like other union republics, nominally has a defense and foreign affairs ministry. On the basis of this pretension to Belorussian independence, Soviet Russia has hoped to use the Republic both in the United Nations and in other international dealings.

In reality, everything in the Republic remained fundamentally with-



out change after World War II, and there continued to be a complete enslavement and subjugation of the peoples by imperial Moscow. The Communists practiced a bloody suppression of the Belorussian people. Anything of distinctively national character was considered a manifestation of "Belorussian bourgeois nationalism," and destroyed. Belorussian national and cultural leaders were deported to Soviet labor camps; artists, teachers, officials, priests, and even members of the Workers Union were hanged. Peasants who had left the collective farm system for individual agriculture were particularly vulnerable to Soviet wrath. Farm collectivization was reintroduced throughout Belorussia. The majority of the male population were taken into the Soviet Army without training, and sent to the front where their chances of survival were nil.

### Communist Suppression

The Soviet's postwar discriminatory policies were applied with particular rigor in Belorussian cultural fields. The country's history was rewritten to stress more emphatically the unity of the east Slavic world, within which the leading role of the Russians was glorified. Stalin was put forward as the "sole creator" of the Belorussian Republic. Belorussian literature was stereotyped into that pattern established for the entire Soviet Union, and is barely distinguishable from other modern Slavic writings.

The language itself is being brought

closer to the Russian, with the Russian language being used in institutions of higher learning, and commonly in the civil service; Soviet textbooks predominate in Belorussian schools. The Russians have been particularly on their guard to criticize Belorussian writers and scholars for lapsing into forms of "bourgeois nationalism."

### The Soviet Hierarchy

In conformity with Soviet practice in all non-Russian Soviet Republics, a small percentage of the political administration is comprised of Belorussian nationals. Even though the man in office may be a Belorussian, his direction reaches him from above, through the double hierarchy of state and party bureaucracy which is subordinate to the government of the USSR.

Indications have appeared which lead one to believe that Belorussian nationalism has been developing in two opposite directions since the war: at home, toward complete dissolution in the Soviet sea; abroad in the *émigré* groups, toward further crystallization of a nationalist doctrine. The political laboratories of the exiles may precipitate a true national sentiment at some time in the future. Evidence for such a hope is either meager or abundant, depending upon which *émigrés* one reads or talks with. What little active nationalism does still exist, appears to exist in exile. Belorussia today, as in the past, is only a nation in the making.



# Rommel

## AT THALA

Colonel Herman W. W. Lange, *United States Army*

ON THE morning of 23 February 1943 a handful of United States and British troops at Thala, Tunisia, awaited the renewal of a devastating attack by General Rommel's forces. A fateful and bloody battle was certain since Rommel had advanced for the last five days, at great cost to the Allies in men and materiel. Rommel's exact objective was not clear, but it was obvious he intended to disrupt the Allied threat to Axis control of Tunisia. Beyond that, he might have planned to cut across the Allied lines of communication from Algeria and jeopardize the entire Allied North African operation.

Although the Battle of Thala is little known, it marked a decisive turning point in the war comparable in its way to stopping the Axis penetration into Egypt, or the defense of Bastogne. Marshal Alexander recalls that Rommel's success:

*... would have upset the whole front and would have led to a withdrawal if not to disaster; the situation was extremely serious and was only stabilized, after periods of very grave danger.*

General Juin stated, "I felt strategic fear, for if Rommel broke through, all of North Africa was doomed."

Why did Rommel fail? His tank waves maneuvered on the ridgeline just short of Thala and *Stukas* dive-bombed the exhausted defenders. His farthest advance, on the night of 21-22 February, had been a penetration into the British defense position. The remnant force of three infantry platoons, 12 tanks, and some artillery seemed to have little chance to halt his spearhead, reported by Allied intelligence to be a composite force of the Axis *Afrika Korps*, the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions.

The Thala defense commander,

Brigadier Nicholson, committed his tanks in a desperate countercharge on the morning of 22 February; none came back. But survivors from the crews reported 70 German tanks and many armored personnel carriers just beyond the ridgeline.

Three United States artillery battalions had arrived to reinforce the small Thala force. They fired at a furious rate that morning. One battery, "C" of the 84th, charged into action on the defense crest and, executing the old movement of "right front into line," dropped trail to fire at pointblank range—an action seldom recorded in 20th century military annals. The Germans were halted.

#### Failure of Organization

Basically, Rommel failed because the principles of good organization were neglected. The ineffective command structure offset Rommel's keen tactical ability and combat aggressiveness. "C" Battery's guns provided the dramatic turning point on the field of battle but Rommel was defeated elsewhere. The Axis lacked unity of command and a clearly defined strategic goal.

Some historians claim that too few units were available for such an offensive. It seems, however, that Rommel had planned well and he felt that his means were sufficient. One military historian notes that Rommel's successes were achieved with minimum forces. But in these cases Rommel at

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least had full control of the means and could jockey them at the last moment, depending on his "feel" of the situation. But for Thala he never received what was promised.

Some claim that faulty logistics bogged the offensive. There was no surplus available for resupply, but a great leader does not need lavish supply.

Some students believe that pressure from the British 8th Army played a part in limiting Rommel's offensive. Study of the nature of Montgomery's pressure, however, shows that this was not an essential factor. If Rommel's plan had been executed and his timing respected, the southern front would have had no effect.

Nor did the air situation paralyze Rommel. The balance of airpower was not overwhelmingly favorable to the Allies and air tactics at this date could not effectively stop a ground offensive.

As for intelligence, this appears to have been a standoff. Rommel's excellent intelligence staff was no more able to show Rommel how close he was to success, than was the Allied G2 successful in clearly estimating Rommel's capabilities.

Axis operations in Tunisia suffered from many problems, each a handicap brought on by violation of the principles of good organization.

#### Staff Weaknesses


There were conflicts of interest between Italy and Germany, the difficulties which one finds in an international staff, the problems of an informal organization (that is, direct relationships between individuals on various staffs) that did not coincide with the official organization chart, and the handicap of too many command echelons. Despite the distance between Italy and Tunisia there was

a failure to delegate authority as the theater grew in size and importance.

Germany did not want to fight in Africa, but gradually was forced to do so by Italian failure to handle the British vigorously. The German *Afrika Korps* was at first an armored detachment intended to train the Italians and bolster their morale. Africa was "Italian territory," so the Germans left the operations up to the Italians. Sensitive to any loss to the

continental viewpoint and was not aware of the inherent difficulties an overseas theater generated. Hitler and the OKW refused to the very end to establish a precise theater objective.

The chain of command to Rommel ran through the Theater Supreme Command in Italy (Figure 1) where German advisors and supporting force commanders had an official relationship that should have left control to the Italians. But the problems



Italian Empire, Mussolini had the Theater Supreme Command strongly reproach Rommel whenever he gave up territory—even when the tactical situation favored such action.

## Too Little, Too Late

Absence of a clear-cut German strategy for Africa was another handicap. When Hitler finally decided in 1942 to make a greater effort in Africa, the requirements of the Eastern Front no longer left him the means. Neither Hitler nor the OKW (Armed Forces High Command) gave Africa a high priority. The OKW had a con-

common to many staffs produced informal relationships, and, in effect, an informal organization functioning outside channels depicted on the official chart. The resulting difficulties, uneconomical in any situation, can be disastrous in war.

## Parallel Channels

While the Italian headquarters was in command of the African forces, the OKW, and Hitler personally, looked over its shoulder. The German General von Rintelen (nominally Military Attaché and OKW liaison officer) and Marshal Kesselring (German Air

Force Commander and Southern Theater Commander of the German forces) were regarded by Berlin as a direct channel parallel to the official one with *Commando Supremo*. Berlin also passed and received official matters from Africa through Kesselring. The relationships were complicated by direct contacts that the African commanders had with Berlin.

The official organization chart shows both Rommel and Von Arnim (commander of the 5th Panzer Army in Tunisia) as responsible directly to *Commando Supremo*. Two independent commands might have worked well enough when the *Afrika Korps* was in Libya and the 5th Army in the northeast corner of Tunisia, but they brought only difficulties as strategic developments brought the tactical and logistical aspects of the commands together. To make matters worse, each of these two commanders had, and used, informal channels that bypassed the command echelon responsible for the theater.

### Resort to Higher Echelons

The lack of delegation of authority forced key commanders repeatedly to travel to higher echelons for conferences. Rommel felt obliged to visit *Commando Supremo*, and Hitler, to defend his concepts and to emphasize his needs.

Kesselring likewise had to make frequent trips to Berlin. His most critical absence was that of 17 February. While he was at Hitler's headquarters his chief of staff (near Rome) telephoned to report that Rommel insisted on Ziegler (commanding a prong of the operation) continuing the attack although Von Arnim had told him to halt. Kesselring told his chief of staff to get *Commando Supremo* to issue an order for

the operation to continue, and that Rommel should be in command. But the chief of staff lacked the authority and nothing was done until Kesselring returned to Rome on 19 February.

Seniority in Africa, or relative priority between the *Afrika Korps* and the 5th Panzer Army, was never clarified. Rommel had landed in Tripoli in March 1941; Von Arnim became active in Tunisia in December 1942. The *Afrika Korps*, therefore, had much experience, was larger than the 5th Army, and Rommel (who also outranked Von Arnim) had gained success and fame. This led Rommel to feel that he was an echelon higher than Von Arnim; there were many indications that this was a fact but *Commando Supremo* never announced it openly—until too late.

### Kesselring's Position

*Commando Supremo* was too distant for effective coordination or to make competent decisions. It acted as if Kesselring were its representative for visits to the combat zone, and at times it seemed to be looking to him for command decisions. However, this was never clear, and if Kesselring sometimes talked like a commander he never made the decisions. It is interesting to note that while Kesselring was an air force general he was apparently accepted as a tactical advisor on ground matters by Rommel and Von Arnim; probably because he was German and also because *Commando Supremo* never provided any other personal contact.

### Rommel Named Chief

Thus, despite many echelons making decisions on Africa, the Germans still lacked a clearly defined command echelon in Africa. A chief was needed to command the operation. It seems

that this was understood for there was talk of making Rommel an army group commander. But the delays of an international chain of command and personality conflicts prevented this desirable step until 23 February 1943, when Rommel finally was named commander of the African Army Group.

It is surprising that Rommel received the command because Hitler

*fluence on Hitler which almost precluded personal judgment and objectivity on the situation. I was in no way Rommel's superior since he was under Commando Supremo; besides, Rommel felt responsible to the OKW with which he had close relationships.*

### Rommel's Background

Renowned as a heroic leader of mountain troops in World War I, and as the author of infantry tactics texts



Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and staff in Tunisia

US Army

considered him worn out. Rommel was in ill health and had insisted, officially as well as personally, to Hitler that he did not believe the Tunisian bridgehead could be held, and that German manpower should be conserved by withdrawal while there was still time.

Rommel had direct personal access to Hitler. In Kesselring's words:

*Rommel had a sort of hypnotic in-*

before World War II, Rommel had commanded Hitler's headquarters, and thereupon sought and received command of a Panzer division. His outstanding leadership was proved by clever tactics that enabled his 7th (Ghost) Division to push through the French line in 1940. Even other German generals had not believed this spearhead operation possible.



Hitler's interest in military matters first brought Rommel to his attention. Their respect for each other probably was heightened by Hitler's distrust of the German General Staff and Rommel's only slightly higher regard for them. The feeling was mutual, however. One German General Staff officer expressed a commonly held view when he said: "... Rommel never bothered to figure out where resources might come from, he managed to make only a mess." For their part, many generals of the General Staff considered Rommel an unprincipled tactician.

The parallel command structure, beset by international command and staff weaknesses, therefore was further impaired by personality conflicts.

Of course, Rommel and Von Arnim had much in common. Both sought victory for Germany. Both were suspicious of Hitler's vague strategic concepts, which often seemed only to sacrifice the German fighting power. Both considered their relations with their superiors as "a war against the rear." But the gulf between the two was deep enough to lead Von Arnim to withhold reinforcements for Rommel's thrust through Kasserine Pass to Thala. A German author says:

*The 5th Army lived on its experiences in Russia and nourished a particular pride. Its attitude toward Rommel was neither fair nor conducive to the accomplishment of the mission.*

### Rommel's Plans

The assault on Thala was to be the climax of Operation *Sturmflut*, the penetration phase following the initial parallel assaults, Operations *Frühlingswind* and *Morgenluft*. Rommel had planned and directed these latter two coordinated attacks, employing units taken from both his and

Von Arnim's armies. Kesselring had told him that if it came to launching the penetration, he, Rommel, would get the command; but it should have been obvious that the breakthrough could not be delayed more than a few hours once the parallel attacks proved successful and also that others besides Rommel would, in some official manner, have to know about the planned command structure. Kesselring observed:

*The command structure did not meet the needs of the theater of operations. This is what allowed the 5th Army to continue under its own maneuver concept at a time when, from all evidence, it should have adapted itself to the envelopment as directed. Rommel felt restrained from taking the drastic steps that the situation required and which were so entirely typical of his temperament.*

### Coordination Not Enough

Rommel and Von Arnim, so Kesselring found, were both strong-willed men. It was impossible to reconcile their differences by simple coordination. Rommel had a spirit of initiative, a grand will-to-win, and was accustomed to expressing himself forcibly and to making rapid and independent decisions. His tactical dispositions frequently were disapproved by *Commando Supremo*, but then, after the prescribed operation had progressed for a time, the *Commando* would change its mind and allow him to do what he had wanted in the first place. Rommel said of Kesselring:

*Despite his undeniable qualities he never understood the tactical and operational peculiarities of the African Theater. He saw everything through rose-colored glasses.*

Rommel was known for his talents of improvisation, the speed of his ma-

neuver, and his ability to modify orders at the last minute in the midst of combat. He often exasperated his officers by such changes. But he did not know how to delegate authority; he not only wanted to do everything himself but he wanted to be everywhere. Often absent from his headquarters, he always appeared at the



US Army

2d Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment,  
march through Kasserine Pass

opportune moment at the vital point to give the action a decisive impulse.

### The Operations

Early in February Rommel saw a chance to relieve the Allied pressure on his lines of communication by an operation in central Tunisia which might inflict serious damage on the Allied forces (Figure 2).

On 4 February he proposed use of his own mobile forces and others available in the theater to drive the Allies back, by Operation *Frühlingswind* through the Faid Pass to Sbeitla, and *Morgenluft* from Gafsa toward Feriana. Further progress in a penetration (Operation *Sturmflut*) at either Sbeitla, Kasserine, or Feriana-

Thelepte would depend on the degree of initial success. He calculated the balance of forces and saw that he needed, besides his own mobile forces of the *Afrika Korps*, the 10th Panzer Division, the 21st Panzer Division (both then under Von Arnim's jurisdiction), and the new *Tiger* tanks (actually a weak battalion also operating under Von Arnim). The plan did not specify where success would be sought and Rommel was somewhat vague in expressing his objectives. But he wanted freedom to drive on Tebessa and destroy this major Allied base for the central Tunisian area.

### Confused Command

Rommel's proposals were never explicitly approved but *Commando Supremo* directed a coordinated drive, the forces for *Frühlingswind* being under General Ziegler, Von Arnim's deputy, and those for *Morgenluft* under General Liebenstein of the *Afrika Korps*. A preliminary conference was held on 9 February and at a meeting with Kesselring at Faid on 13 February the commanders conferred and agreed on the assault for 14 February.

Von Arnim speaks of having been "advised to turn over to Rommel's forces the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions on 17 February." At the 9 February conference, the plan examined indicated that success of *Frühlingswind* would mean a major offensive to follow immediately, with these two divisions under Rommel's orders. The term "advised" is thus suspect; at any rate Von Arnim did not fully release the units.

The outstanding success of the attack brought the Axis forces to Sbeitla and Feriana in three days. But the advantage gained by this rapid action was frittered away. Ziegler looked to




FIGURE 2.  
AFRICAN BATTLEGROUND  
February 1943

Von Arnim for further guidance, and about 24 hours were lost before *Commando Supremo* told Von Arnim to comply with Rommel's order. Meanwhile Ziegler accepted Von Arnim's direction to stand fast "having accomplished his mission." Von Arnim, desiring to apply pressure in northern Tunisia, pulled off the few *Tiger* tanks that he had committed and part of the 10th Panzer Division claiming that the *Tigers* needed maintenance and the 10th Panzer had to go to Kairouan for gas.

### Delay Spells Defeat

The Allies were reeling from heavy materiel losses, high personnel losses, and lowered morale. Rommel saw the chance to strike for a major Allied defeat at Tebessa and in the Allied rear. Some even suppose that he foresaw a drive across the Allied lines of communication toward Bône. In any case, early on 18 February Rommel asked *Commando Supremo* for approval to launch *Sturmflut* with all the forces originally requested. He could not yet tell whether Sbeitla, Kasserine, or Feriana-Thelepte was the weakest point. Once again *Commando Supremo* hesitated, and repeated messages passed between Rommel, Von Arnim, *Commando Supremo*, and OKW. Von Arnim argued for his more northern effort, Rommel urged speed and force, *Commando Supremo* feared too bold a flanking swing, and Kesselring shuttled back and forth between Tunisia and Rome, even visiting Hitler.

Rommel sent another message to *Commando Supremo* late on the 18th and also ordered Ziegler to probe beyond Sbeitla to test this axis. After a day's delay, *Commando Supremo* approved the operation but changed the goal to Le Kef, saying nothing

about the command problem but implying that the units requested were available to Rommel. Rommel thought he had the force requested and issued attack orders.

Meanwhile the Allies had consolidated at Sbeitla and seemed to have more strength on the Thelepte-Tebessa road so Rommel decided to penetrate at Kasserine on 19 February. He grumbled to Kesselring that the objective of Le Kef put him up against the major Allied force, failed to destroy the vital base and airfields at Tebessa, and was not the tactical envelopment in which he believed. However, he planned to carry out orders. Kesselring thought that the mission still allowed an effort at Tebessa, while Von Arnim "feared" that Rommel intended to go there anyway.

Rommel, as was his custom, went to each force command post repeatedly, watched the intelligence reports closely, and went into the frontlines to find out the actual situation. Finding that the Kasserine drive was sticking to the valley road, he took personal control and ordered the infantry battalions to climb the surrounding heights. The force got through but only after a day's delay which violated Rommel's demand for speed.

### Time Runs Out

Rommel saw the affair as a race and realized that he had to succeed before the Allies could bring up their reserves. On the morning of the breakthrough at Kasserine Pass, Rommel suddenly found out that Von Arnim had not yet released half of the 10th Panzer, and that the *Tigers* were not coming at all. The race against time became more desperate.

The only Allied reserve in Rommel's path on 19 February was British

Brigadier Dunphie's force of about a tank battalion, five tank destroyers, several infantry companies, an artillery battalion, and a small reconnaissance unit. The Allied command limited Dunphie's delaying force toward Kasserine Pass to 11 tanks, the tank destroyers, one battery, and some infantry. On the morning of 20 February this small detachment started

man attack commander wanted to stop but Rommel refused. The 10th Panzer, still operating mostly in column on the road, managed to slip into the Thala defense position after dark by following the last withdrawing detachment through the minefield gap. A confused battle of several hours followed. Tanks fired at 10-meters range on each other and most of the



US Army

#### Antiaircraft crew at Kasserine Pass on lookout for enemy bombers

its action by blocking, pulling back from ridgeline to ridgeline when under overwhelming pressure. An infantry battalion arrived at Thala for Dunphie's blocking position late on 20 February and had until 1800 on 21 February to prepare a strong point on the ridge five kilometers from Thala. The delaying force lost almost all its equipment but accomplished the mission.

As dark fell on the 21st the Ger-

British infantry were captured. The Germans then pulled back a short distance to await daylight.

#### Artillery Turns the Tide

Meanwhile Brigadier Nicholson had arrived to assume command of the defense force (the "Nickforce") and during that night three United States Army artillery battalions (part of the 9th Division Artillery) joined the force. Early on 22 February Nicholson decided that the only hope was an ag-

## ROMMEL AT THALA

gressive attitude, and threw his remaining 12 tanks at the Germans while his artillery fired at maximum rate. All the tanks were destroyed, but Rommel must have been influenced by the artillery fire. He wrote later:

*It was evident from the volume of artillery fire that we would not go very far. We were astonished by the flexibility and precision of the American artillery.*

The German force commander claimed that the Allies were ready to

(Commander, Combat Command "C," 1st Armored Division) whose force was on the west side of the unfordable Oued Hatab. The plan called for an attack to be launched when Rommel again drove into the Thala position. Rommel's intelligence intercept may well have picked up the indications of the counterstroke but his intelligence failed to show how weak the Allied force actually was.

By contrast, Rommel's force in the Kasserine-Thala salient on 21 Feb-



US Army

### Elements of a tank destroyer group on reconnaissance in Kasserine Pass area

launch a counterattack. The direct fire of Battery "C," 84th Field Artillery Battalion, on the Thala crest not only dissuaded the Panzers, but it demonstrated a mood of aggressiveness that made a counterattack against the Kasserine penetration appear most natural.

### Counterattack Plans

In fact, an Allied local counterstroke had been planned between Nicholson at Thala and Robinett

ruary consisted of elements of the 10th Panzer, 21st Panzer, and (Italian) Centauro Divisions, and the 501st (Tiger) Tank Battalion. Kesselring said:

*One should have withdrawn from all fronts absolutely everything which could be released. Even if as a result the front had been paralyzed it would have been handsomely recompensed by the victorious blow in the enemy's rear.*



One can agree on that point, and observe only that such thoughts did not give rise to any action.

In the area of contact on the evening of 21 February the Axis forces had a clear advantage. Only the courage of a handful of men prevented a complete rupture of the Allied positions. The proportions may seem weak for an attack (assuming that the attacker should have a 3 to 1 superiority), but it should be noted that the defended front was always much

pull some forces from in front of Sbeitla and Thelepte.

If Rommel had received the forces he wanted and expected, or if the timing had been as he wanted, he undoubtedly would have broken through at Thala. Once beyond the Thala saddle, he would have been on the open road. A series of broad valleys lead either to Tebessa or into Algeria, parallel to and behind the Allied line on the Tunisian mountain chain.

The loss of the only airbase near



An American M4 tank near Thala, Tunisia

US Army

wider than the front of attack. The use of surprise, tactical flexibility, and the force Rommel expected to have had at his command could have won victory. A German general says that Thala should have been handled by a pincer movement using strong infantry pressure via Djebel Bireno. "The attack should have continued by night." In view of the Allied shortage of infantry this would have succeeded. One wonders why Rommel did not

Tebessa would have forced Allied air, already weak in close support capability, back 260 kilometers to Chateaudun. In early 1943 this distance was almost beyond the range of the fighter bombers available. As General Alexander said, "If Rommel had penetrated our feeble covering force he would have found few obstacles."

Thinning of the Allied line to gain a larger reserve was not risked because of the continual Axis probing.

The Allied command was convinced that Fondouk would be the crucial point of an Axis counterstroke and General Bradley remarked that this belief was almost fatal. Not until late 21 February did the Allies conclude that the Thala attack was Rommel's main effort.

Rommel says that he could have attacked three weeks sooner if the necessary command decision had been forthcoming. This would have given him enough time to have engaged the Allies to the north and then turn back against Montgomery.

In regard to the thought that logistics hindered Rommel, it must be admitted that supply was a serious problem from the theater viewpoint. But the G4 of the *Afrika Korps* stated that Rommel's offensive was not lost through faulty logistics. He admitted that Rommel usually paid too little attention to logistical matters, yet Rommel had told *Commando Supremo* he wanted to take the offensive with full backing "if the state of supply of the 5th Army so permitted."

He was supposed to receive the 10th Panzers' normal issue of supplies but Von Arnim did not release them, even after the 21 February guidance from *Commando Supremo*. It later became evident that there was enough because Von Arnim launched another offensive right after the end of Rommel's drive. Even so, after Thala, Rommel still had enough fuel for 250 to 350 kilometers, and four days of other supplies, but limited ammunition.

It is difficult to understand why Rommel let the situation develop in

this manner—that he never foresaw a lack of cooperation, that he never insisted on a detailed written plan, and that he did not understand the cumulative delays that slow an agile leader.

The damaging effect of an organizational failure on field commanders is evident when as strong a character as Rommel's suffered from it. Kesselring said that when he visited the tactical command post on 22 February he found Rommel low in spirit: "He seemed disgusted and lacked confidence in his mission." Rommel's conclusion was: "*The Commando Supremo's* change of objective threw my maneuver plan into the sea."

Be that as it may, the battle that could have led to Axis control of the ground on which the whole Allied front depended ended the campaign. If Rommel's aggressive mood had been shared by his superiors—and if he had received all the means that he had reason to believe were available—the Allied front would have been broken.

The lessons learned from this operation are not new or even startling, but they do confirm our reliance on continued education in the principles of command, organization, and administration. That a leader as renowned and capable as Rommel should suffer from the neglect of these principles, that an army as militarily adept as Germany's should permit them, and that a combine as powerful and successful as the Axis should be defeated by them, merely emphasizes their validity.

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Review



Major Warren K. Wells, *United States Army National Guard*

**N**OT many years ago a soldier with a rifle occasionally could bag a low-flying enemy plane bent on the destruction of ground targets. In an earlier period pilots using hand weapons took potshots at enemy aircraft with surprisingly deadly results.

Today, on the ground and in the air, a changing technology that has given increased ranges, higher speeds, greater accuracy, and more lethal payloads to both missiles and planes has nullified these primitive defense efforts. Weapons which relied primarily on human reflexes are no longer effective. The oceans to the east and west of our continent no longer shield our industrial and population centers.

Obviously air defense is a large and complex problem. One aspect of more than casual interest to both the military and civilian population is the air defense of the Continental United States.

Under present-day concepts, the primary goal is to deter an enemy from air assault on the US by making him see that his probable losses are not worth the risk. If that deterrent fails, the goal is to deny the enemy destruction of the centers of America's retaliatory and productive might.

The Army carries out its part of the over-all air defense mission through its Air Defense Command (ARADCOM), which provides combat-ready forces to the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) for the air defense of critical locations. ARADCOM's contribution includes surface-to-air missile units that shield the major "target" centers of the United States.

Units armed with anti-aircraft guns, such as the 90 and 120-mm and the 75-mm *Skysweeper*, formed the nationwide Army organization into which, starting in 1953, guided mis-

siles were phased. Although the introduction of guided missiles brought greater protection it also brought greater problems; not the least of which was how to make best use of our limited resources.

This and other considerations led to the incorporation of selected Army National Guard missile units into the Nation's air defense system. As trained personnel and materiel became available, guard units replaced some of the regular units. Transfer of Active Army sites to the National Guard frees *Nike Ajax* crews of the US Army Air Defense Command for further assignments in the missile field, including conversion to *Nike Hercules* units.

### First Active Army Mission

In 1954, for the first time in the history of the United States, units of the Army National Guard were given an Active Army mission to perform in time of peace. The tradition of the civilian soldier, standing ready to be called to the defense of his country in times of national emergency, had arrived at a new era.

Today, in 14 states in the Continental United States, 76 Army National Guard batteries are manning *Nike Ajax* air defense missile sites which provide protection 24 hours a day for 15 major population and industrial centers; and six Hawaii Army

National Guard batteries are operating *Nike Hercules* air defense missile sites providing round-the-clock protection for four areas in that state. The outward appearance of these units and their performance of the air defense mission is identical to that of the Active Army.

Active Army units man each *Nike Ajax* site with 111 active duty personnel, officer and enlisted. Army National Guard units man a site with 48 guardsmen, officer and enlisted, working as technicians in uniform but in a civilian status. The remaining members of each unit, which at its reduced tables of organization and equipment (TOE) strength consists of an additional 63 officers and men, carry on in the traditional concept of the civilian soldier by attending weekly training drills and annual summer encampments. This reflects a substantial defense savings principally because the Active Army units have higher manning requirements.

This program had its beginning in 1950 during the Korean emergency. Brigadier General Joseph B. Frasier, Commanding General, 108th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, Georgia Army National Guard, and a group of National Guard antiaircraft artillery officers were requested to conduct a study to determine if a mission of air defense in the Continental United States should be given to the Army National Guard. A positive decision was reached by this group, and following two years of intensive spade-work a conference was held in the Pentagon at which the adjutants general of the states involved were requested to present their views. The mission was accepted and action was taken to formulate the plans required to phase guard units into the training

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
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cycle at the Air Defense School, Fort Bliss, Texas.

Of the 48 full-time officers and enlisted technicians employed on a Nike site, 39 are required to attend service schools. There are 12 separate courses at four different service schools involved in the training cycle for a mis-

technicians are hired 21 days prior to their departure for service schools to enable them to receive familiarization and basic missile training at home stations. The unit training in the package phase consists of the complete assembling, warheading, fueling, testing of the guidance and fire control



Technicians check their target requisition radar during an annual service practice at McGregor Range, New Mexico

sile battery plus one additional course at battalion level. The courses vary from eight to 45 weeks, followed by four weeks of specialist training and eight weeks of unit training. The input into the various courses is phased to permit all men to complete their individual training at the same time, so the "package" can be assembled and begin unit training without delay. In the interests of economy, troop-trained specialists and package

equipment, and actual missile firing on the McGregor Range in New Mexico.

### High Standards Required

The programming of this training cycle was scheduled to coincide with the availability of Nike Ajax missile sites for the National Guard. Active Army units were then in training to operate Nike Hercules sites. As they were deployed to the Hercules sites, the guard assumed operational con-

trol of the *Ajax* sites that were vacated. In Hawaii six National Guard units went directly to the *Hercules* sites which were constructed in 1960-61. Prior to being given operational responsibility for a missile site, the guard unit was put through an operational readiness evaluation test to determine if it met the standards required to accomplish the mission.

The Army National Guard technicians are civilian employees of the respective states, and are paid from Federal funds in accordance with the salary schedules of Federal civil-service classified employees and Army-Air Force wage board scales. They must be members of the unit and are given civilian job titles that are closely related to the military occupational specialty each performs in the unit. All technicians wear their regular military uniform and hold the rank of their TOE position. Even though they are civilian employees primarily, they function on almost the same lines as though they were on active military duty. Military courtesy, discipline, and customs of the service are adhered to rigidly. However, these personnel are not subject to the Code of Military Justice in their performance of duty as technicians. The minimum work week is 40 hours with certain adjustments made to permit the scheduling of shifts on 24-hour tours.

The technician's status as a civilian employee does not entitle him to such privileges and benefits as post exchange service, medical care for himself and dependents, or service retirement. Instead, he is compensated by a salary that provides him with the means to purchase these items on the open market. The salary generally is comparable to that paid for jobs requiring like skills in civilian industry.

However, as a member of the National Guard of the United States, he earns retirement credit as a reservist by his participation in weekly training assemblies and the two-week annual field training period each summer.

### Selecting Personnel

The method of selecting personnel is an important factor in enabling the guard to perform this mission with its limited number of full-time technicians. Unlike Active Army units, which must requisition to fill personnel shortages, the process of selecting technicians is similar to that used in private industry. Educational standards are set, experience and training backgrounds are prescribed, and a series of tests and interviews are conducted prior to any formal hiring action. The applicant also must be a member of the guard or be eligible for enlistment. Each position carries a series of special qualifications that make it possible for the unit commander to select personnel who are best fitted for the position. Every technician understands that he holds his job by virtue of his professional ability and his willingness to maintain his performance at the highest possible peak of efficiency.


Another important factor which lends considerable weight to the soundness of using the guard for this program is the high degree of skill which the technicians develop as they continue to perform their duties. Since they are civilian career employees and not subject to transfer or redeployment to other areas or assignments, they will become increasingly proficient at their particular job.

In addition to their own positions, they are cross trained in other specialties so that considerable depth is at-



tained even with the limited number of personnel authorized. This stability in employment will reduce the training expense at service schools which is encountered by the Active Army in the continuous training required to replace officers and enlisted men who return to civilian life after they have completed their military obligation. Another savings has been

locations, it was necessary to build in equipment to simulate the operations and computations involved in a missile firing to determine operational capability. The complex electronic components require constant adjustment and testing to ensure maintenance of peak efficiency. To ensure that this operational capability is maintained on a 24-hour a day basis the units are



Moving a missile from the elevator to a launcher above ground at a fixed site

attained in this program by hiring prior service personnel as technicians who have been trained in technical fire control and missile maintenance during their service period.

#### Maintenance of Equipment

The success of the air defense mission requires that all equipment be constantly maintained in operational condition. Since it is not feasible actually to fire missiles from the present

subject to unannounced periodic operational readiness evaluation tests by their higher headquarters. The number and command level of these tests are prescribed by regulations. During these tests the performance of the equipment and operating personnel is closely evaluated both visually and photographically. A data recorder photographically records the operations of the major components from the

time the mission is started until after a simulated burst of the missile on target. Through this process the actual operational condition of the battery can be determined at any time and any malfunctions that have occurred can be detected and corrected.

Annually, the personnel of each missile battery are airlifted to the McGregor Range in New Mexico, where they conduct an actual missile service practice under conditions which most closely approximate the pressures of an enemy engagement. This is a complete missile battery test and each step is graded to evaluate the performance of the technicians while engaging a high-speed aerial target with live missiles. This testing process takes about two weeks and every operation is performed. This involves drawing an uncrated missile from the depot; complete assembly and testing of the missile; fueling and warheading the missile; testing and adjusting fire control equipment; bringing the equipment to a "red status" (ready to fire); and then locating, tracking, and engaging the aerial target.

The command of these units is exercised through National Guard channels. The guard is responsible for training, administration, discipline, recruiting, and the day-to-day activities that are not directly related to ordering the unit to engage enemy targets. Training programs are developed that provide both daily training for the technicians and weekly training for those members of the unit who are not full-time employees.

## Operational Control

Operational control of the units has been granted by the governors of the various states through their adjutants general to the Active Army and is exercised through air defense channels.

This places the day-to-day operational control under the defense commander charged with the air defense of a specific area. The Active Army defense commander, therefore, has the authority, when ordered through air defense command channels, to designate targets to be engaged by guard units. He also has been given the authority to conduct certain technical inspections and operational readiness evaluation tests to determine the capabilities and state of readiness of the missile batteries.

At the annual general conference of the National Guard Association of the United States held in Hawaii during October 1960, Lieutenant General Robert J. Wood, Commanding General of the United States Army Air Defense Command, predicted that additional Nike Hercules missiles would be assigned to the National Guard as new and later style missiles were assigned to Active Army units. He also said that the guard may be assigned eventually the Nike Zeus. General Wood said further:

*It is comforting to know that National Guard units with missile experience stand ready to expedite the conversion to the ballistic defense system.*

It is well known that the defense of the Continental United States has assumed an increasingly critical nature in view of the nuclear and missile capabilities of modern warfare. The protection of our country requires that this mission be performed by utilizing sophisticated equipment operated by experienced and well-trained personnel. It is conceivable that all of the material and manpower resources of the country may be required—the contribution of National Guard Air Defense units should be substantial.



# CIVILIAN ROLE IN ANTIGUERRILLA WARFARE

Major John B. Bellinger, Jr., *United States Army*

**G**UERRILLA warfare has always been the Communists' preferred form of aggression. Karl Marx himself first advanced the theory of such warfare as an instrument of revolutionary power; Lenin restated the view in observing, "Guerrilla warfare is the inevitable form of struggle when the mass movement has reached the stage of rebellion." Since World War II we have seen guerrilla war become the most common form of overt warfare, and Communist successes in the Soviet Union, China, Indochina, and Cuba will undoubtedly heighten the Communist preference for its employment.

Guerrilla warfare is essentially a political problem. Failure to appreciate its political character has caused most of the Free World's failures in dealing with this menace. Mao Tse-tung has stated the case:

*Without a political goal guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political aspirations do not coincide with the aspirations of the people, and if their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained.*

In any future war involving the

United States, the principal agency of the theater army commander in dealing with local political problems will be the Theater Army Civil Affairs Command (TACAC). Hence it will play a leading role in the theater army's operations against guerrillas. Since our Army has not heretofore given much attention to antiguerrilla warfare as a mission of the TACAC, a concept of antiguerrilla operation must be developed for this command.

The strength of a guerrilla movement exists in the support given it by the civilian population. The civilian populace furnishes the supplies, manpower, knowledge of terrain, intelligence, and moral support which are essential. The support of the population may be willingly given, or it may be extracted by political suasion or even terror as in Algeria and Indochina.

The population itself is the Achilles' heel of the guerrilla movement, for it is exposed while the active guerrilla organization is hidden. The army can deal directly with the population, while it is extremely difficult to come

to grips with the guerrillas. A basic objective of antiguerrilla operations is, therefore, to separate guerrilla forces from their civilian support.

In pursuit of this objective, the TACAC might well observe several general principles, which emerge from a study of Free World successes and failures during the past two decades.

First, it will be necessary to organize a stable, effective, and friendly local government. This may sound like a mere restatement of a basic principle of the TACAC, and indeed it is. But success in antiguerrilla operations will require a broader and deeper application of this principle than would be necessary in a situation where no serious guerrilla threat is posed.

The TACAC must persuade the local government to make such political and economic reforms as are necessary. This need not imply the creation of a government similar to our own. But the local government must clean up any corruption that may exist, and must give the population the opportunity to earn a fair living in accordance with the standards prevailing in that particular area of the world. The only man who has won a guerrilla war against the Communists in Southeast Asia, Ramon Magsaysay,

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former President of the Philippines, has observed, "In order to stamp out communism, the local government must clean its own house."

## Political Reform

This task will be a difficult and a delicate one for the TACAC, and will require personnel of great political, diplomatic, and economic ability. Nonetheless, it is essential. In Algeria, the greatest boon to the rebels during the first 16 months of the war was furnished by the French Government in ignoring needed political reforms. As Captain Boyd T. Bashore has observed in the May 1960 issue of the *MILITARY REVIEW*: "In order to win the support of the population the government must offer the people something better than communism." To accomplish this, the TACAC may have to apply political and economic pressure to the local government; it may even be necessary to press for a new and more responsive government.

A second principle is that the TACAC must make arrangements for the indigenous government itself to take over the antiguerrilla campaign. There are two reasons for this. The first is again a basic civil affairs consideration: to release United States troops for frontline duty. The second reason is that the employment of indigenous forces against the guerrillas is more likely to succeed. The local troops' familiarity with the terrain, language, customs, and mode of fighting of the guerrillas is invaluable. Foreign (that is to say, American) troops, moreover, are certain to be less welcome among the people. In Korea, according to a former Soviet officer, it was "not until South Korean units were assigned the task of combating the partisans (that) they were effectively halted."

The TACAC should encourage the indigenous government to take over the antiguerrilla mission at all echelons: the army, local militia, and local police. Time may be required to organize these units effectively; therefore, it may be necessary to phase in the local government's responsibility gradually, as the indigenous capability increases.

### Prevention of Terrorism

A third suggested principle is to prevent a campaign of terrorism against the civilian populace, either by US or local forces, in reprisal for the activities of the guerrillas. Retaliatory campaigns against the civilian populace have never been a successful method of dealing with guerrillas. Such campaigns tend to inflame the population rather than subdue it. In Algeria, a few intemperate actions of the French Army and police have resulted in serious setbacks to the program for winning over the population, and they have not served to diminish the practice of terrorism by the rebels.

In the Soviet Union large-scale guerrilla resistance during World War II was not initially made by the population. The natives generally welcomed the German troops as liberators. However, when the German military forces moved forward, the civil affairs responsibility was taken over by the Gestapo, whose administration was so harsh that it provoked the rise of the guerrilla movement. As stated by Alexander Dallin in *German Rule in Russia 1941-1945*, "The spread of partisan activity in the Soviet Union can be attributed more to hatred of Erich Koch (Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine) than to love of Josef Stalin." A policy of fighting terror with terror cannot succeed against guerrillas.

### Technical Assistance Programs

A fourth principle is to institute a program of technical assistance—a "pacification" program as it is called by the French. This program consists in sending small teams of soldiers into the countryside to live among the people, to assist them at the grassroots level. In Algeria a portion of the French Army builds and teaches schools, rebuilds bridges, helps with irrigation and farm projects, and assists with medical and public health problems. In this way the army wins the confidence and support of the population and, at the same time, improves the standard of living, thus making the area less vulnerable to Communist propaganda. Such a program was extremely successful in the Philippines in the war against the Huks.

When the rebel organization is particularly strong, drastic measures such as regroupment or resettlement of the population may be necessary. This program might best be directed by the technical assistance teams after they have had at least initial success in winning the confidence of the people. Such programs were very successful in Malaya, Algeria, and Cambodia where the presence of "shadow" rebel governments in every village restricted the freedom of the population. Resettlement provided improved economic conditions, a village self-defense system, and, most importantly, destruction of the rebel political organization.

Finally, the TACAC must win public opinion. It must undertake an aggressive, coordinated program of political and psychological orientation for the populace—a consolidation psychological warfare tactic. All available media should be employed. The cam-

paign objectives (of the government and the US forces) should be publicized clearly. It should be made clear that the cooperation of the people will bring them both assistance and freedom.

### Political Orientation

Such a program of political orientation was used successfully in the Huk campaign in the Philippines. Lieutenant Colonel Luis A. Villa-Real has described the procedure:

*Screening points were set up periodically in each community, and all persons were screened against the [intelligence] files. . . . After the screening the civil affairs unit held a rally, with short educational talks on citizenship, democracy, the role of the army in antiguerrilla warfare, and communism.*

Propaganda themes must be chosen carefully to appeal to the needs of the local population. For example, the theme of "the American way of life," while attractive to Americans, means precisely nothing to the people who live in many areas of probable conflict. Most Asians are not influenced by thoughts of refrigerators and vacuum cleaners, which are complete intangibles to them. Another aim of political orientation is to discredit the guerrilla leaders with the population. Confidence in the leadership and ultimate success of the guerrilla movement can thus be undermined.

Civil affairs psychological warfare units can be used effectively against the guerrillas themselves. Loudspeaker and leaflet teams were effective in the

reduction of the Huks in the Philippines. When appropriate for use, amnesty terms and reward offers should be widely publicized and scrupulously observed.


### A Concept for TACAC

An analysis of recent guerrilla wars may well provide a concept of operations for the Theater Army Civil Affairs Command, should the United States become involved in such a war in the future. The guerrillas, as we have seen, are most vulnerable through the civilian population upon which they depend.

The TACAC, in its primary role with the theater army in an antiguerrilla operation, might well observe the five rules which have been outlined here: It should organize a stable, friendly, and effective indigenous government, and should make arrangements for this government to take over the antiguerrilla operation from US forces. It should prevent any campaigns of terrorism against the civilian population. It should institute a technical assistance program; and finally, it should win public opinion by an aggressive program of political orientation.

The reverses which the Free World has suffered in the guerrilla wars of the last two decades dictate that the United States Army must learn to cope with threats of this kind. The Civil Affairs Command, combating guerrillas by destroying the popular support upon which they depend, can become a major force opposing Communist aggression.





# Africa... Proposed

## Military Alliances

**D**URING recent years a giant military vacuum has developed in the central African region. This vacuum harbors great danger for the African populace as well as for the Western World. Insecurity is caused by the political and social movements of the African nations and by the efforts of the Communist bloc to undermine Western Europe's strategic position by uncovering its rear and flank. Therefore, efforts in the African area to create military alliances to improve the security of the individual nations are of vital importance to Europe and the West.

Three concepts of such alliances have been discussed recently. The one proposed by the Ghanaian President is the most extreme. Nkrumah wants an African army under a joint command which, either independently or by order of the United Nations, "shall render assistance to each state of the Black Continent in which incidents like in the Congo take place." Offers for participation were extended to the United Arab Republic, Ethiopia, Liberia, Guinea, Tunisia, Morocco,


Libya, Mali, and the Sudan. The large group of French-speaking African states which recently have become independent, and Nigeria, the largest of the west African countries, were not invited.

According to the original proposals of Ghana, a headquarters was to be established at a "suitable location in Africa" and Emperor Haile Selassie was to be the supreme commander. There was no intention of creating an organization patterned after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the Warsaw Pact.

Ethiopia and Liberia, the states that have been independent the longest, declined participation first. Their chiefs of state described the plans for an African high command as premature. Criticized also was the choice of the countries which were to participate in the project. In their opinion it was

*This anonymous article is translated from the original which appeared in WEHRKUNDE (Federal Republic of Germany), February 1961.*

## Proposed African Military Alliances



\* ALGERIA IS MADE UP OF THE ALGERIAN AND SAHARAN DEPARTMENTS OF FRANCE. THE FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS OF THIS AREA CURRENTLY IS THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATION.

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a random selection. The exclusion of Nigeria, because of her defense pact with Great Britain, also was questioned. They sharply disapproved of an unofficial suggestion that the joint forces be trained by Soviet officers.

### **Agreements and Disagreements**

In the meantime, the chiefs of state considered to be neutralists agreed to preliminary moves. King Mohammed of Morocco, President Nasser of the United Arab Republic, President Nkrumah, Sekou Touré of Guinea, Keita, Mali's Chief of State, the Libyan Minister of Exterior, representatives of Ceylon, and Algerian nationalists agreed at a conference in Casablanca to establish a command of chiefs of staff. According to the agreement the members were to meet regularly to safeguard the "defense of Africa against aggressions" and to preserve the security of each individual state; however, the formation of a joint command did not materialize because none of the conference members was willing to subordinate his soldiers to another.

Decisive objections were raised in Casablanca by President Nasser who saw in the proposed high command an opportunity for penetration of "foreign elements" and reduction in sovereignty. His conditions included the withdrawal of all "imperialistic officers" from the African forces.

The extent of this demand becomes clear if one knows that the majority of Ghana's Army officers were supplied by Great Britain and that the instructors of the Ghana Air Force are Israelis, that is, Nasser's mortal foes. It was planned that the Israelis would be relieved by Englishmen in March. Like conditions prevail in Ghana's as yet insignificant Navy. Libya also employs Englishmen. Frenchmen serve

in Mali, not to mention the Soviets and Czechoslovakians in Guinea.

Not only objective doubts, but also political decisions revealed that nationalism still is stronger than the concept of a "Pan-African Community." The series of hotly disputed compromise-resolutions showed how ill-prepared the participants of the Casablanca Conference were to sacrifice their special demands and to deviate from their established courses. It is easy, therefore, to conclude that the announced command of the chiefs of staff is, in the end, only rhetorical in character.

### **Former French Territories**

The intention of the former French territories to conclude a mutual defense treaty may have a better chance for success because it can be based upon plans laid earlier by the government in Paris. Guinea and the Mali Republic will not participate. Mali's demand for the evacuation of the French military bases in the Sahara indicates that she is more likely to collaborate with Guinea than with the other French-speaking countries.

However, the form and effect of the proposed defense pact in west and equatorial Africa probably depends on the repeal or revision of the Franco-African Community. The community was organized in 1958 and later supplemented by new agreements. De Gaulle desires its revival with joint offices to guarantee close cooperation with France in regard to foreign politics and defense. He considers the granting of economic aid as an exchange for the support of France's position as a major power and wishes to organize the defense system on this basis.

A strong minority of the community members—that is, the Ivory

Coast, Dahomey, Niger, and Volta—wants to break the existing tie and organize an alliance of the states emerged from the former French colonies in Africa. This would permit a union with Nigeria, Ghana, and Guinea. Such an alliance would limit its cooperation with Paris on foreign politics to regular consultations. The four countries declare that they are willing to permit French military missions and instructors in their territories and to accept supply of materials, but they refuse military bases.

### South African Treaty Organization

The idea of creating a South African Treaty Organization (SATO) on the model of the Atlantic Pact Organization is furthered primarily by the South African Union. South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia; South-west Africa, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland are mentioned as future member states. In contrast with the west and central African states, the promoters of SATO want a tight defense organization headed by a powerful commander in chief with a combined staff. The supreme command would have at its disposal fully mechanized units formed into combat-ready brigades.

Until recently Pretoria and Cape-town envisioned the only danger as a threat of submarine war by Moscow against the south African coast. These

same circles presently think it possible that the Kremlin will penetrate African states and threaten the southern portion of the African Continent from within. After the recent incidents in the Congo, this danger is being taken more and more into consideration. The leaders in south Africa have serious doubts that democracy can be achieved in Africa in the near future. In their opinion a stabilized Africa with a democratic form of government will take at least several decades.

The fear is that new dictatorships may find the internal situation so difficult that neighboring states in south African territories may be attacked as a diversionary measure. Justification will be made that the brothers who are still suffering under the pressure of the whites must be liberated. The possibility that an attack of this type might develop into an African Korea, supported by volunteers and supplies of weapons from Eastern bloc countries, is very real in the opinion of those who advocate SATO.

Even those who do not consider south Africa grossly endangered recommend the military alliance. However, they stress explicitly that the mission of leadership is to make the millions of Africans in their immediate neighborhood more loyal and more content to prevent unrest in the hinterland in an emergency.

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# MILITARY

# NOTES

## UNITED STATES

### NORAD's Underground Headquarters

The projected headquarters of the North American Air Defense Command, in the Colorado mountains, has been described as "the world's most sophisticated cave." By 1965, under present plans, NORAD will be located in its new headquarters deep inside Cheyenne mountain, southwest of Colorado Springs.

NORAD, set up by the United States and Canada operating as a team, is the nerve center of continental air defense.

Total construction cost for the new protected headquarters is estimated at 25 million dollars. An additional 41 million will be spent on electronic and other equipment necessary to detect enemy attack from the air. The mountain headquarters will have three main chambers, each 320 feet long, 45 feet wide, and 56 feet high. In addition, two utility rooms, each measuring 100 by 45 by 36 feet, will be stored with electronic gear.

The headquarters will have two tunnel entrances, each nearly a mile long. Provisions, water, and fuel will be stored deep beneath the surface.—News item.

### Ultraviolet Communications

Tests conducted by a major industrial firm indicate the feasibility of using an ultraviolet beam in lieu of radio waves as a carrier for communications.

Particularly adaptable for long-range space communications, the ultraviolet technique affords a remarkable savings in electrical power. Tests indicate that ranges of over 32 million kilometers are possible with one watt of radiated power. An equal range with radio frequencies would require at least 100 times that power. Ultraviolet communications would also permit the use of much smaller antennas, a vital consideration on space vehicles.

The ultraviolet radiation is strongly attenuated by the earth's atmosphere; therefore, its use will probably be limited to space communications. One proposal to overcome this difficulty is to transmit signals from the earth to a relay satellite via radio, and the satellite would then relay the signal to a space vehicle via ultraviolet radiation.

Tests indicate that ultraviolet signals in the low frequencies may be less vulnerable to atmospheric attenuation and may provide an alternate solution to the problem.—News item.

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## Barreled Building



US Army

Shown above is a test model of a foam plastic building recently constructed at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, by the United States Army Engineers using liquid plastic formed into rigid panels at the construction site (MR, Apr 1961, p 100).

## Light Helicopter Prototypes

Two companies will develop prototypes of the new light observation helicopter (LOH) intended to replace three current Army aircraft. Replacement of the *L-19* fixed-wing aircraft and the *H-13* and *H-23* helicopters by the single new LOH is planned for the 1965-70 period.

The two prototypes will be developed in competition with each other, and will be evaluated through a user-test program by the Army Aviation Board, Fort Rucker, Alabama. Bell Helicopter's *D-250* and Hiller Aircraft's *Model 1100*—the competing prototypes—are cowinners of a competition that involved a number of manufacturers and 12 designs.

The Director of Army Aviation has stated that he expects the first purchase of the new LOH to be made in mid-1963. First deliveries should be

in the hands of troops sometime in 1965. According to present plans, each company will deliver seven aircraft for testing. After the tests, one aircraft will be selected.

The new LOH is designed to fly for three hours at a speed of 200 kilometers per hour. It will weigh less than 2,400 pounds, and will carry up to four men including the pilot, or 400 pounds plus the pilot and copilot or crewman. With relatively little preparation, the LOH will be air transportable in the *C-130E Hercules* transport plane, which is to be the backbone of strategic and tactical airlift available to the Army for the next five years. Four LOHs will go into a *C-130*. They can be put in operating condition in less than an hour after landing.

The LOH is intended to replace some 3,200 aircraft now in use, on a one-for-one basis, and also to fill the requirement for 19 additional aircraft per division.

The Army's Director of Aviation has stated that the Army will continue to build up its aircraft inventory over the next 10 years. By 1970, he said, the Army would be flying more than 8,000 aircraft, the majority of them LOHs and *HU-1A* utility helicopters. To fly these planes, there will be 10,000 pilots in the Army. If the LOH proves as easy to maintain as design standards require, the director observed, it should go to every rifle company in the Army as the company commander's personal vehicle.

An industry spokesman has stated that the Army's procurement order—4,000 LOHs during the next decade—will be "the largest manned aircraft procurement since World War II, in terms of units produced."—News item.



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Competing prototypes of the Army's proposed light observation helicopter (LOH) are pictured here in full-scale mockup. The Bell D-250 (above) and the Hiller Model 1100 (below) will be tried out in test-model form during 1963.




### 'Flex Wing' Aircraft Tested

A radically new type of aircraft with no conventional control surfaces is being flight tested on contract from the Army Transportation Research Command. Designated the *Flex Wing*, it carries its pilot and 100-horsepower engine below a kitelike fabric wing. Control is accomplished by tilting the wing with respect to the heavy, low-

supported above the flat, truck-bed type body by a light truss structure. The engine is mounted at the rear; the pilot sits at the front. Four lightweight wheels make up the landing gear.

The craft is extremely stable, is easier to fly than a conventional airplane, consumes fuel at a low rate for



*Flex Wing* supporting a helicopter-towed load

hanging engine. In addition to its low cost the new type offers promise of meeting battlefield requirements for short takeoff and landing on rough fields and for very slow flight at tree-top level. The prototype already tested flies at altitudes under 500 feet, at speeds up to 60 miles per hour.

The *Flex Wing* is a remarkably inexpensive vehicle; the cloth wing is

its payload capacity, and has a simple structure, powerplant, control system, and accessory group. Its payload, it is hoped, will be more than 50 percent of its gross weight, compared to less than 30 percent for most solid-winged transports. Its control system somewhat resembles that of a blimp; although it cannot bank in the normal sense, it can climb, dive, and turn

efficiently, and is difficult to stall.

Experimenters also report that flexible-wing aircraft may have large loads slung under them and then be

towing such gliders. The stability of the flexible wing makes it unnecessary to have pilots aboard the gliders.

While an extremely wide variety of



*Flex Wing aircraft*

towed like gliders behind fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. It has been estimated that the payload of a helicopter may be increased six times by

application is conceivable for the flexible wing, the one that seems most promising for the Army is the small battlefield transport.—News item.

### **New Defense Intelligence Agency**

The Department of Defense will establish an intelligence agency which will be staffed jointly by the services, will be headed by an officer of three-star rank, and which will report to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, according to a recent announcement.

The principal objectives in establishing this agency are to obtain unity of effort among all components of the Department of Defense in developing military intelligence, and a

strengthening of the over-all capacity of the Department of Defense for collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence information.

There has been some duplication of effort in this area, and defense officials feel that by putting some of the intelligence activities of the department into a joint agency, they will be more effective. The unified and specified commands and the services will retain such functions as tactical and technical intelligence.—News release.

## SWITZERLAND

### 'Bloodhounds' Purchased

Switzerland is reported to have contracted for the British-built *Bloodhound* surface-to-air missile (MR, Dec 1960, p 70) for use by her armed forces. The manufacturer has announced a 75 million-dollar order for the weapon.—News item.

## UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

### Conscription Instituted

South Africa has instituted compulsory military training to build up a war strength militia army to augment her small professional army. Each recruit will receive three months' basic training, followed by six months' training in active units.—News item.

## GREAT BRITAIN

### New Hovership

Undergoing trials on Gare Loch, Scotland, is a 60-foot experimental hovership. Designated the *D1*, the 4½-ton prototype vessel uses two 25-horsepower engines to furnish high-pressure air to lift the bottom out of the water while its side walls remain submerged to a depth of about six inches.

The British builders of the hovership hope to have a passenger-carrying version in operation by the end of 1962.

A major objection to previous air-cushion vehicles was the spray produced by the air cushion which caused obscuration and required protection



British Information Services

### New hovership design

Two 35-horsepower outboard engines with variable pitch propellers provide forward propulsion to "sled" it across the water.

for passengers and cargo. The provision of light side walls to contain the air cushion appears to have eliminated much of this difficulty.—News release.

## New Missile Destroyer

Britain's second guided missile destroyer, the *HMS Hampshire*, has been launched and is expected to join her sister ship, the *HMS Devonshire*, in the British Fleet in 1962.

The *Hampshire* has a standard displacement of over 5,000 tons, is approximately 158 meters long, and has a beam of about 16 meters. She will carry a *Seaslug* air defense missile system, two *Seacat* short-range air defense missile systems, and a *Wessex* helicopter antisubmarine system. —News item.

## 'Blue Water' Fired

Great Britain's *Blue Water* corps-support surface-to-surface tactical missile has completed its first firing



*Blue Water* missile

tests successfully. The solid fuel rocket was fired from a launcher mounted on a three-ton truck. *Blue Water* (MR, Dec 1960, p 68) is scheduled to become operational in 1963. —News item.

## SWEDEN


### More Missiles

Approximately 10.4 million dollars will be invested in guided missiles by the Swedish Government during 1961-62. —News item.

## JAPAN

### Armored Troop Carrier

An armored troop carrier, strongly resembling the United States *M59*, has been developed for the Japanese Army. It is lighter and smaller than



*Soldat und Technik*

### New armored troop carrier

the *M59*. A .30-caliber machinegun is ball mounted in front of the driver, and a .50-caliber machinegun, protected by a small shield, is mounted on the top of the vehicle. The suspension system and tracks resemble those of the American model. The vehicle carries 10 to 12 men; a modified model, the *SX*, has been developed into a mortar carrier. —News item.

## EAST GERMANY

### Aircraft Production Ends

East Germany's state-owned aircraft industry has been phased out of the airplane business. The industry is being converted to the production of machine tools and factory equipment needed to increase the production of consumer goods. Dresden was the center of the East German aircraft effort with about 20,000 people employed in six plants. The *Ilyushin-14* transport was the primary item produced by the industry. The change-over to nonaviation production has been in progress for many months.

Official reasons for the lowering of economic goals in East Germany have included: inadequate capacity to pro-

duce machine tools, insufficient raw materials, shortage of skilled labor, and past failures to meet production goals. To solve these problems, closer ties with the Soviet Union are projected for the future. A major factor underlying the official reasons is believed to have been the constant stream of refugees out of East Germany into the Western Zone. Well over 100,000 persons per year have crossed the border since World War II. Among the refugees, professional people, engineers, and technically skilled workers have formed a large segment.—News item.

### Paramilitary Training

The East German Society for Sport and Technic is reported to be a paramilitary organization designed to train women in "the theory and practice of the profession of arms." A West German source reports that approximately 60,000 women and girls are now undergoing training in the organization which has a total strength of 400,000 members. Training consists of 80 hours of instruction which must be accomplished in four months. Completion of the instruction is mandatory for all members.—News item.

## WEST GERMANY

### New Destroyers Approved

Members of the Western European Union have approved a request from the West German Government to build eight 6,000-ton destroyers capable of firing guided missiles. The objective of the new vessels is to "make it possible for the German naval forces to carry out the defensive missions assigned to them by NATO." The new destroyers will be considerably larger than any naval vessels the country now has in commission.—News item.

## BRAZIL

### 'Whirlwind' Helicopters

The Brazilian Navy has taken delivery of three British-built *Whirlwind* helicopters to be employed aboard



British Information Services  
British *Whirlwind* helicopters

the 18,000-ton aircraft carrier *Nael Minas Gerais*. The carrier is the former *HMS Vengeance* which was recently refitted in the Netherlands.—News item.

## NATIONALIST CHINA

### 'Hercules' To Chinese

The Republic of China has become the first allied nation in Asia to possess and man the *Nike Hercules* missile. The first firing was over the Taiwan Strait, destroying a target at a height of more than 9,000 meters. This was the first time that the American-made *Nike Hercules* was ever fired by foreign troops on foreign soil. The launching came just 21 months after the Nationalist government assumed operational control of the United States Army's 2d Missile Battalion.—News item.



## ISRAEL

### New Entry In Space Research

Israel became the seventh country to enter the field of space exploration with the recent firing of a multistaged meteorological rocket. The vehicle was a *Shavit* (Meteor) II which was planned, built, and fired by a crew of Israeli scientists and technicians. The *Shavit II* weighs between 550 and 660 pounds and has an altitude capability of about 80 to 100 kilometers.

Other countries who have successfully fired space probes are France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the USSR, and the United States.—News item.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### Air Defense Missiles

A Czechoslovakian news agency reports that the Czechoslovakian armed forces "have been equipped with the most modern air defense rockets." The new weapons were shown during a recent parade in Prague.—News item.

## GHANA

### Volta Dam Project

A contract has been awarded for the construction of the first portion of a dam and hydroelectric project on the Volta River in western Africa. The system, expected to cost 168 million dollars in all, will provide power for an aluminum industry. The main dam, to be constructed by an Italian engineering firm, will be 2,100 feet long and 370 feet high. The first power is expected to flow in 1965.—News item.

## USSR

### New Air Strength

Several new Soviet aircraft were displayed in a recent air show in Moscow. Included were bombers, fighters, flying boats, and helicopters.

A new heavy bomber which was first

noticed on 27 June was observed more closely during the demonstration. This aircraft mounts four unusually large jet engines and is reported to be larger than the United States *B-52*. Observers estimated that it was capable of supersonic speeds.

A medium bomber, similar in size to the US *B-58*, was also observed. This aircraft was described by the Soviet commentator as "supersonic" and "could travel several times the speed of sound." It has sharply swept-back wings and uses two engines set at the rear on top of the fuselage, divided by a vertical tail fin.

A twin-jet supersonic light bomber with jet intakes located forward of the wings and exhaust pipes set in the tail, and a new, twin-jet flying boat, described as an antisubmarine aircraft, were also shown.

Three new types of helicopters were demonstrated. One extremely large model was estimated by observers as being capable of carrying a light tank or a passenger load of 100 persons. Also shown was a flying-crane type of helicopter and a triple-tailed turbine-powered helicopter equipped to fire rockets.

A large vertical takeoff and landing transport aircraft similar to the British *Rotodyne* was shown. This plane employed two rotors mounted above the wings for vertical lift, and two conventional propellers for forward thrust.—News item.

### Nuclear-Powered Tank

An unidentified German source reports that Soviet scientists are working on the development of a nuclear-powered tank. It is reported that such a vehicle would have a range of "thousands of kilometers" without refueling.—News item.



# MILITARY

# BOOKS

**FIGHTS, GAMES, AND DEBATES.** By Anatol Rapoport. 400 Pages. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1960. \$6.95.

BY LT COL WILLIAM N. MARTASIN,  
AGC

Conflict, according to Rapoport, is the "very texture of our existence." *Fights, Games, and Debates* is a study of conflict as a mode of human behavior on all levels. In this study a scientific method is proposed which could possibly lead to an understanding—and perhaps control—of human conflict in all its forms and at all levels, including global conflict.

The author, senior research mathematician for the University of Michigan's Mental Health Research Institute, is a biophysicist, mathematician, and philosopher as well as a student of social science. He has done an outstanding work of research in the preparation of this text. The result is a well-documented analysis which should broaden the reader's understanding of such new disciplines as "social physics" and "game theory"—and the application of these disciplines to current problems in international relations.

One does not have to be a mathematician to understand the application of scientific method to forms of conflict, as expressed in the many lucid illustrations contained in this book. The three forms of conflict are described as fights, games, and debates. In a fight the objective, "if

any," is to harm the opponent; in a game the object is to outwit the opponent; in a debate the objective is to convince the opponent—to make him see things as you see them. The task Dr. Rapoport has set for himself is not to examine conflicts for their own interests, but to determine and relate the "different kinds of intellectual tools for the analysis of conflict situations."

The basic difference between a fight and a game, as seen by Rapoport, is that a fight can be idealized as devoid of the rationality of the opponents, while a game is a struggle in which complete "rationality" of the opponents can be assumed. Both these forms of conflict, however, can be analyzed by means of mathematical equations.

Techniques based on brainwashing, psychoanalysis, logic, and semantics—rather than mathematics—are more effective in debates.

While Dr. Rapoport does not believe that mathematics can explain an "arms race" or "war fever," he maintains that:

*The approach of the social physicist should remind the political historian and the social moralist that there may be social forces operating which are as blind and as powerful as the atmospheric forces which determine the weather.*

These forces are worth seeking and studying.

**THE WATERY MAZE. The Story of Combined Operations.** By Bernard Fergusson. 445 Pages. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1961. \$7.50.

MAJ ROBERT C. BURGESS, *Arty*

There is a chance that American military readers interested in the subject of this work may pass it by because of its subtitle. The book deals, not with what Americans term "combined" operations, but with amphibious warfare. The author, a retired British brigadier, preferred to refer to his subject in the British parlance of World War II, since he is essentially telling the story of Allied amphibious operations of that period.

Brigadier Fergusson writes with the authority of long experience. He served with British Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) during World War II, and was its director for two years after the war.

Much of the book pays tribute to Admiral Mountbatten, who took over COHQ as a youthful captain in the Royal Navy late in 1941. Under his leadership this interservice staff developed the techniques and equipment ultimately so successful in the invasion of Africa, Sicily, and Normandy.

The bulk of the book is devoted to activities during the planning and preparation for the major amphibious operations in Europe. There are on-the-scene accounts of the development of the staff to its true interservice stature, and of the development and testing of the many specialized vehicles and devices required to mount such major operations as *Husky* and *Overlord*. The lessons learned from each operation are discussed lucidly, and their application to later operations is well covered.

Final chapters include a summary

treatment of amphibious operations in Southeast Asia and of the Port Said operation of 1956.

This is a fine, authoritative work, written with humor and candor. It will be especially valuable to those interested in amphibious operations, and may well become a classic in this field.

**MISSISSIPPI IN THE CONFEDERACY. As They Saw It.** Edited by John K. Bettersworth. 362 Pages. Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, La., 1961. \$5.95 each, \$10.00 boxed set.

**MISSISSIPPI IN THE CONFEDERACY. As Seen in Retrospect.** Edited by James W. Silver. 319 Pages. Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, La., 1961. \$5.95 each, \$10.00 boxed set.

BY LT COL FRANKLIN M. DAVIS, JR.,  
*Armor*

Issued in response to a 1958 Mississippi law authorizing a centenary publication, these accounts extol Mississippi's part in the War of the Rebellion. Editors Bettersworth and Silver have let Mississippians speak for themselves in these two volumes. Culling from a wide variety of local sources, the editors establish the motivation and pace of Mississippi's contribution to the Confederacy through the eyes, emotions, and words of key figures involved.

The collection is intended as a lasting monument to Mississippians in the Confederacy. Editorials, letters, speeches, and accounts of the times do, in fact, make up a monument in mosaic.

This mosaic, however, needs more of a binding than the fact of Mississippi's participation to integrate its elements into a useful narrative of the war.

**RUSSIA AND THE WEST UNDER LENIN AND STALIN.** By George F. Kennan. 411 Pages. Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass., 1961. \$5.75.

BY LT COL DONALD S. BUSSEY, *Inf*

Professor Kennan's book is a penetrating study of the relationship between the USSR and the Western Powers, from the revolution of October 1917 until the end of World War II. The early chapters are devoted to an analysis of the circumstances surrounding the Soviet separate peace with Germany in World War I, and the Allied intervention in the Soviet Union in 1918. Here, the author has succeeded admirably in exploding the myth fostered in Soviet historiography, that the Allied intervention of 1918-20 represented a concerted effort to overthrow the Soviet Government. Nonetheless, Professor Kennan suggests that this "ill conceived interference" contributed to the victory of bolshevism throughout the USSR.

The book presents a revealing account of other principal developments between the World Wars: the "Russian problem" at the Peace Conference of 1918-19, Russo-German relations, the Stalin purges, and the Russian-German Nonaggression Pact.

Of greater significance, however, are these conclusions which the author draws from his study:

The Allies' quest for "total victory" in World War I represented a misunderstanding of the uses and effects of war. (Kennan is no less critical of the policy of "unconditional surrender" in World War II.)

From the outset, Soviet policy has been characterized by contradictory elements: the doctrine of "coexistence," but also, "the most determined efforts behind the scenes to destroy

the Western governments and the social and political system supporting them."

Any concept which regards the present antagonism between the Soviet Union and the West as absolute, demanding the destruction of Soviet power, is inadequate. While Soviet statesmanship does display "dangerous dreams of world hegemony," it is in other ways indistinguishable from the normal maneuverings of governments.

In the modern world it is necessary to have dealings with both friends and enemies.

The problem of dealing with Russian communism is primarily one of understanding.

Changes which have taken place in the Soviet regime since the death of Stalin are deep and significant.

While one must agree with the author that developments in the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin are of undoubted significance, there is nothing in contemporary events to suggest any change in the fundamental Soviet purpose: "to destroy the Western governments." Moreover, this purpose is in no way inconsistent with the doctrine of "coexistence." The objective of destroying Western governments can be viewed as inherent in the Soviet "coexistence" strategy. One may also question whether achieving a greater "understanding" of Russian communism is likely to modify, in any significant degree, the problems which the West must solve in its relations with the Soviet Union.

Despite these reservations Professor Kennan's study represents a milestone in historical synthesis. In style and substance, it will prove a refreshing experience to the reader.

**TURKEY AND THE WORLD.** By Altamur Kilic. 224 Pages. Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1959. \$4.50.

Justice William O. Douglas in his introduction to this work expresses his admiration for the democratic secular nation which Turkey has become during the years since Atatürk came to power.

The author, a Turkish journalist and historian, has written an interesting and significant account, giving particular attention to Turkish-American relations and Russo-Turkish problems.

**MALTA CONVOY.** By Peter Shankland and Anthony Hunter. 256 Pages. Ives Washburn, Inc., New York, 1961. \$4.00.

By MAJ ROBERT C. BURGESS, *Arty*

The story of the "last ditch" relief of the island of Malta by a British convoy in mid-August 1942 is stirringly told in this easily read, authoritative book. One of the authors writes from the basis of experience since he was a crew member of one of the naval vessels involved in this action.

The central figure of the story is a stoutly-built American tanker, the *Ohio*. This vessel—one of the newest, fastest, and largest of its day—would provide the greatest assurance of getting desperately needed oil through to strategic Malta. That she made it, and saved the day, is a tribute to her rugged construction and the equally rugged will of her hand-picked British crew. Her back so badly broken she would never sail again, held afloat by being supported between two naval vessels, she limped into Grand Harbor and delivered her vital cargo.

The naval actions during the convoy's passage through the Mediterranean are described realistically.

**ABANDONED.** The Story of the Greely Arctic Expedition 1881-1884. By A. L. Todd. Introduction by Vilhjalmur Stefansson. 323 Pages. McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York, 1961. \$5.95.

Lieutenant Adolphus Washington Greely, a serious Signal Corps officer, led a highly successful and equally tragic exploration party in one of the first deep penetrations of the Arctic North in 1881. *Abandoned* is the gripping story of the trials, successes, and failures of this band of 25 men from the time of their departure until their seven surviving members were rescued in the summer of 1884.

Despite the hazards of weather, starvation, and ill-fated rescue attempts, the survivors, including Lieutenant Greely, maintained and recorded masses of factual data and scientific observations until shortly before their rescue. These data are the basis of much of our current knowledge of the polar regions.

Based entirely on factual research, the book is a lively adventure-history which holds the reader's interest without recourse to fiction.

**A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF MODERN IRAQ.** By Abid A. Al-Marayati, Ph. D. 222 Pages. Robert Speller & Sons, Inc., New York, 1961. \$6.00.

Iraqi diplomacy is consistently distinguished, in this treatment, from the evolution of foreign policy itself. The point is made that traditional "great power" diplomacy has been modified considerably during the United Nations era by the increased importance of the small national states. The book is a useful and detailed analysis, although its dissertation format (nine chapters, with 26 appendices) does nothing to enhance its appeal to the general reader.

**SEAPOWERS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE.** By Anthony E. Sokol. 268 Pages. Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1961. \$6.00.

By CAPT JAMES R. THOMSON, *USN*

Power is a function of motion, and transportation and maneuver are essential elements of motion. Where massive opponents are encountered, the basic capability to outflank and outmaneuver may provide the only successful solution. Professor Sokol has set for himself a triple task: First, he makes inquiry into the meaning of seapower and its nature; second, he indicates the impact of the nuclear age upon it; and third, he suggests means whereby and areas in which seapower can aid the United States in coping with international problems.

Professor Sokol admits that he hardly expects universal acceptance of his arguments concerning a subject matter which has been held so controversial as this. However, he points out that if the nature of seapower (which extends far beyond navies alone), and of our national dependence upon this power are more thoroughly understood, the discussions surrounding it should become more rational.

He strongly states the case for a navy in its proper relation to land and air forces, but makes clear that the United States and the oceanic confederation of the Free World without dominating seapower would be lost.

A small nuclear war would bring an almost irresistible urge to use the next larger size weapon.

*Thus political, psychological, and even economic reasons may prevent the military use of any kind of nuclear weapons, even if such use would be feasible and desirable from the point of view of the field commander*

Under such conditions sea-based power, with nuclear or conventional ordnance, constitutes one of the ideal means of projecting graduated degrees of assistance or force into probable trouble areas. As one proposal, the author suggests that a relatively large contingent of seaborne troops be stationed in several strategic ocean areas as quick-reaction, flexible, and well-supported fire fighters who would operate from, but not be dependent upon, available Free World bases.

Finally, the continued establishment of strategic weapons systems at sea brings the obvious advantages of reduced vulnerability at home and of a reduction in homeland military targets.

Professor Sokol's study is a scholarly and well-documented treatise.

**THE LAST FRONTIER: A Short History of Alaska.** By Ben Adams. 181 Pages. Hill & Wang, Inc., New York, 1961. \$3.50.

From the 18th century exploits of Bering, through the careers of such gold-rush personages as Soapy Smith, to the present day, this historical account is presented in terms of personalities and events. Among the best features of the book are 30 fine illustrations by the Eskimo artist George Ahgupuk.

**THE ORIGINS OF INTERVENTIONISM.** The United States and the Russo-Finnish War. By Robert Sobel. 204 Pages. Bookman Associates, Inc., New York, 1960. \$4.50.

American attitudes in the field of foreign policy are here dealt with in terms of the isolationism of the 1930's, as that policy was changed by the pressure of events from 1939 onward. American reactions to the Soviet attack on Finland are described and interpreted in detail.





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